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CIS Critical Security Controls v8.1

Document Control:

Version: 2.0 Last Updated: April 2026 Owner: Paul Leone Framework Version: CIS Controls v8.1


CIS Control 1: Inventory and Control of Enterprise Assets

Safeguard Requirement Implementation Notes
1.1 Establish and maintain detailed enterprise asset inventory External Excel Inventory, Checkmk inventory, Wazuh agent inventory (31+ endpoints), Prometheus node exporters, PatchMon tracking (30+ hosts), DNS records, SSH host keys in Ansible Compliant — Cloud inventory integrated: 8 cloud nodes across AWS (EC2 t3.micro Amazon Linux 2, c7i-flex.large Windows Server 2025), GCP (2× e2.micro, us-central1-c), and Azure (Standard_B2ats_v2 Ubuntu 24.04, Standard_E2s_v3 Windows Server 2025) — all enrolled in Checkmk, Wazuh, and PatchMon via Tailscale
1.2 Address unauthorized assets weekly Partial — NetAlertX network discovery identifies unknown on-premises devices. Cloud asset weekly review documented: Tailscale admin console (tailf07c05.ts.net) lists all enrolled nodes; AWS EC2, GCP Compute, and Azure VM consoles serve as authoritative cloud inventory sources reviewed weekly N/A — Single user lab environment
1.3 Utilize an active discovery tool (IG2) NetAlertX network discovery, nmap scans, custom Python scanner Compliant — On-premises active scanning in place; cloud-native discovery via provider instance APIs and Tailscale admin console
1.4 Use DHCP logging to update inventory (IG2) Asus Router DHCP logs (192.168.1.0/24) + pfSense DHCP logs (192.168.100.0/24) forwarded to Splunk/Elastic Compliant — Cloud nodes use private IPs assigned via provider DHCP (AWS 172.31.x, GCP 10.128.x, Azure 10.130.x); IP assignments logged in provider VPC/VNet DHCP lease records
1.5 Use passive asset discovery tool (IG3) NetAlertX provides real-time alerts for new MAC/IP associations; Suricata performs deep packet inspection to identify asset types Compliant — Passive discovery via traffic analysis extended to cloud segments via Flow Logs

Control 1 Overall Status: Compliant — Cloud node inventory integrated; minor process documentation gap in combined review procedure


CIS Control 2: Inventory and Control of Software Assets

Safeguard Requirement Implementation Notes
2.1 Establish and maintain software inventory External Excel Inventory, PatchMon Software Inventory (5,000+ packages across 30+ hosts + 6 Linux cloud nodes), Checkmk inventory, Nessus software scanning, Wazuh agent software tracking Compliant — PatchMon extended to Amazon Linux 2, Debian 13.4, and Ubuntu 24.04 LTS cloud nodes with daily NVD CVE correlation. Windows cloud nodes (AWS, Azure) tracked via WSUS
2.2 Ensure authorized software is currently supported PatchMon tracks EOL software; vulnerability scanners flag unsupported versions; documented exceptions for necessary legacy software Compliant — AWS Amazon Linux 2 EOL status monitored; Azure/GCP OS image currency tracked via Checkmk and Wazuh vulnerability assessment; WSUS validates Windows Server 2025 support currency
2.3 Address unauthorized software monthly N/A — Single-user lab environment N/A
2.4 Utilize automated software inventory tools (IG2) PatchMon agent-based inventory, Checkmk, Wazuh software tracking, Nessus authenticated scans Compliant — PatchMon agents deployed on all 6 Linux cloud nodes; Wazuh agents on all 8 cloud nodes provide real-time package and process inventory; automated daily checks
2.5 Allowlist authorized software (IG2) Not Implemented — No application allowlisting solution deployed on-premises or cloud nodes Gap — Implement AppLocker/WDAC (Windows), or CrowdSec allowlisting
2.6 Allowlist authorized libraries (IG2) Not Implemented — No DLL/library allowlisting on-premises or cloud nodes Gap — IG2 requirement not addressed
2.7 Allowlist authorized scripts (IG3) Not Implemented — No script execution control (PowerShell Constrained Language Mode, etc.) Gap — IG3 requirement not addressed

Control 2 Overall Status: Partially Compliant — IG1 fully compliant including cloud scope; IG2/IG3 gaps in allowlisting remain


CIS Control 3: Data Protection

Safeguard Requirement Implementation Notes
3.1 Establish and maintain a data management process Documented in GRC document; data classification, retention, disposal procedures defined Compliant — Cloud scope added: AWS S3 CloudTrail log buckets (SSE, 90-day retention), GCP Cloud Storage (default encryption, audit logging), Azure Log Analytics workspace homelab-log (90-day retention, encrypted at rest)
3.2 Establish and maintain data inventory Sensitive data tracked in inventory; backup data cataloged; scan credentials documented Compliant — Cloud data inventory: AWS S3 buckets, GCP GCS buckets, Azure Log Analytics workspace, and cloud node EBS/Managed Disk/persistent disk volumes documented with owner, sensitivity classification, and retention policy
3.3 Configure data access control lists File system ACLs; SSH key-based access; database access controls; Authentik RBAC Compliant — AWS IAM instance profiles with least-privilege roles (no wildcard actions, no long-lived access keys on EC2); GCP service accounts with minimal role assignments (no owner/editor on Compute instances); Azure RBAC scoped per resource group; Tailscale ACL policy governs all inter-node access
3.4 Enforce data retention 90-day log retention; backup retention policies; automated cleanup Compliant — AWS CloudTrail logs delivered to S3 with 90-day lifecycle policy; GCP Admin Activity logs retained per GCP defaults; Azure Log Analytics homelab-log configured for 90-day retention
3.5 Securely dispose of data Secure deletion procedures; encrypted backup disposal; NIST SP 800-88 alignment Compliant — AWS EC2 EBS volume deletion documented in decommissioning runbook; GCP persistent disk deletion policy documented; Azure Managed Disk cleanup included in decommissioning checklist
3.6 Encrypt data on end-user devices Windows BitLocker, Linux LUKS, encrypted laptop drives Compliant — Cloud nodes not classified as end-user devices; cloud storage encryption covered under 3.11
3.7 Establish data classification scheme (IG2) Sensitivity tiers (Public, Internal, Confidential, Restricted) defined with handling requirements; used in documentation Compliant — Cloud data classified under same scheme: CloudTrail logs (Confidential), GCP audit logs (Confidential), Wazuh agent telemetry (Internal)
3.8 Document data flows (IG2) Partial — Network architecture documented; full data flow diagrams not comprehensive Gap — Cloud flow paths added: Wazuh agent telemetry (cloud nodes → Tailscale → Wazuh Manager 192.168.1.219), CloudTrail (AWS API → S3), GCP Audit Logs, Azure Monitor (Azure API → Log Analytics homelab-log → Sentinel); comprehensive on-premises data flow diagrams still needed
3.9 Encrypt data on removable media (IG2) USB drives encrypted; backup tapes encrypted Compliant — Cloud nodes have no removable media
3.10 Encrypt sensitive data in transit (IG2) TLS 1.3 (Traefik), SSH encryption, syslog-ng TLS, VPN encryption Compliant — All management traffic encrypted via Tailscale WireGuard (ChaCha20-Poly1305); SSH AES-256-GCM for Linux cloud node terminal access; no plaintext management paths exist
3.11 Encrypt sensitive data at rest (IG2) Encrypted backups, database encryption, scan credential encryption Compliant — AWS S3 SSE for CloudTrail logs; GCP persistent disks encrypted by default (Google-managed keys); Azure Managed Disks and Log Analytics workspace encrypted at rest by default
3.12 Segment data processing based on sensitivity (IG2) VLAN segmentation; backend isolation (Traefik); network segmentation Compliant — Per-provider network isolation: AWS VPC (172.31.0.0/16), GCP VPC (10.128.0.0/16), Azure VNet homelab-vnet2 (10.130.0.0/16) each isolated; inter-cloud communication only via Tailscale overlay
3.13 Deploy Data Loss Prevention solution (IG3) Not Implemented — No DLP solution deployed on-premises or for cloud egress paths. Cloud egress filtering: AWS Security Group outbound rules restrict to required management destinations; GCP VPC firewall policy limits egress; Azure NSG outbound rules enforce explicit allow-list Gap — IG3 requirement; provider egress filtering provides partial compensating control; planned Q2 2026
3.14 Log sensitive data access (IG3) Partial — File access logged via Wazuh FIM; database query logging not comprehensive Gap — AWS CloudTrail logs all S3 data access; GCP Data Access audit logs capture GCS bucket access; Azure Log Analytics access logged via Azure Monitor; Wazuh FIM on all 8 cloud nodes monitors file access in configured sensitive paths. On-premises database audit logging incomplete

Control 3 Overall Status: IG1/IG2 Compliant including cloud scope; IG3 Partial (DLP not deployed, cloud egress filtering provides compensating control)


CIS Control 4: Secure Configuration of Enterprise Assets and Software

Safeguard Requirement Implementation Notes
4.1 Establish and maintain secure configuration process CIS Benchmark audits via Wazuh SCA; configuration drift detection; automated remediation via Ansible; Ansible baselines; IaC version control Action Required — Formal secure configuration policy document needed; cloud scope: Ansible linux_hardening.yml and new_install_baseline_roles.yml applied to all 6 Linux cloud nodes via SSH over Tailscale; Azure ARM template (azuredeploy.json) version-controlled in Git
4.2 Establish secure configuration process for network infrastructure Network device hardening standards documented; SSH hardening policy; firewall rule standards Compliant — AWS Security Group rules documented (tailscale-access + lab-services with explicit inbound/outbound allow-list); GCP VPC network firewall policy (homelab, 17 rules, Google Threat Intelligence blocking for TOR exit nodes, malicious IPs, and sanctioned countries); Azure NSG homelab-nsg2 (explicit allow-list, DenyAllInBound at priority 65500)
4.3 Configure automatic session locking 15-min timeout (general OS); 2-min timeout (mobile devices); enforced via GPO/Ansible Compliant — Windows cloud nodes (AWS, Azure) subject to same GPO session lock policy via domain join to home.com over Tailscale
4.4 Implement firewall on servers UFW (Linux), Windows Firewall, iptables rules managed via Ansible Compliant — AWS Security Groups serve as host-level firewall for EC2 instances; GCP VPC network firewall policy applies to all Compute instances; Azure NSG homelab-nsg2 applied at subnet level; Ansible linux_hardening.yml configures UFW on Linux cloud nodes as additional host-based layer
4.5 Implement firewall on end-user devices Host-based firewalls enabled on all endpoints; default-deny ruleset Compliant — Cloud nodes are servers; host-based firewalls covered under 4.4
4.6 Securely manage enterprise assets SSH key-based admin access; IaC version control (Git); HTTPS-only management interfaces Compliant — All SSH/RDP to cloud nodes restricted to homelab subnets (192.168.0.0/16) via provider-native firewall rules; Tailscale WireGuard mandatory for all cloud management access; no public management ports exposed on any cloud instance
4.7 Manage default accounts Root login disabled (SSH); default vendor accounts removed; validated via Nessus scans Compliant — Ansible new_install_baseline_roles.yml disables root SSH login and removes default accounts on Linux cloud nodes; Windows cloud nodes joined to domain and local Administrator account managed via GPO
4.8 Uninstall unnecessary services (IG2) Minimal service footprint; unnecessary services disabled; verified via authenticated scans Compliant — Cloud nodes provisioned with minimal base images; Wazuh SCA validates running services against CIS benchmarks on all cloud nodes
4.9 Configure trusted DNS servers (IG2) Enterprise-controlled DNS (Technitium DNS/Unbound); DNSSEC validation Compliant — All Linux cloud nodes configured with on-premises Unbound resolvers (192.168.1.153, 192.168.1.154) as DNS servers via Tailscale tunnel; Windows cloud nodes (domain-joined) use on-premises AD DNS (192.168.1.152, 192.168.1.142) via Tailscale
4.10 Enforce automatic lockout on portable devices (IG2) Failed auth lockout (laptops: 20 attempts; mobile: 10 attempts) via GPO/MDM Compliant — Windows cloud nodes subject to same account lockout GPO (5 failed attempts, 10-minute lockout) applied via domain policy over Tailscale
4.11 Enforce remote wipe capability (IG2) Not Implemented — Mobile/laptop remote wipe via planned MDM; laptops rely on full-disk encryption Gap — Mobile/laptop remote wipe; cloud instance termination provides equivalent data destruction for cloud nodes
4.12 Separate enterprise workspaces on mobile devices (IG3) Not Implemented — No Android Work Profile/iOS Managed App separation Gap — IG3 mobile device management; not applicable to cloud nodes

Control 4 Overall Status: Needs Process Documentation (4.1 critical); cloud node configuration management integrated into existing IaC


CIS Control 5: Account Management

Safeguard Requirement Implementation Notes
5.1 Establish and maintain account inventory Authentik user database, Active Directory accounts, SSH key inventory (Ansible), Wazuh user tracking Compliant — AWS IAM users/roles and service accounts inventoried; GCP service accounts listed in GCP IAM; Azure Entra ID accounts (cloud-only and domain-synced) tracked in Azure Active Directory; Wazuh agents on all cloud nodes report active local accounts
5.2 Use unique passwords Vaultwarden password manager; 8-char minimum (MFA accounts); 14-char minimum (non-MFA) Compliant — No shared credentials on cloud nodes; SSH key-based auth for Linux (no passwords); Windows cloud nodes use domain accounts managed by GPO password policy
5.3 Disable dormant accounts after 45 days Automated via Active Directory account expiration policies; Authentik account lifecycle management Compliant — AWS IAM access keys reviewed quarterly (no long-lived keys on EC2 — instance profiles used); GCP service accounts audited via IAM recommender; Azure Entra ID accounts subject to same 45-day dormancy policy
5.4 Restrict admin privileges to dedicated accounts Separate admin accounts (no dual-use); SSH sudo enforcement; Authentik RBAC Compliant — AWS IAM instance profiles scoped to minimum required actions (no AdministratorAccess policy); GCP service accounts use minimal roles (no owner/editor); Azure subscription admin access MFA-enforced via Entra Conditional Access
5.5 Establish service account inventory (IG2) Service accounts documented in inventory; ownership tracked; quarterly reviews Compliant — AWS IAM instance profiles (terraform-token, ansible) documented; GCP compute service accounts listed; Azure Managed Identity or service principals documented with assigned roles
5.6 Centralize account management (IG2) Authentik SSO + Active Directory; centralized SSH key management (Ansible) Compliant — Linux cloud nodes centralized via Ansible-managed SSH keys; Windows cloud nodes centralized via Active Directory (domain-joined over Tailscale); cloud console access centralized via provider IAM with MFA

Control 5 Overall Status: Fully Compliant — Cloud node accounts integrated into existing lifecycle management


CIS Control 6: Access Control Management

Safeguard Requirement Implementation Notes
6.1 Establish access granting process Documented onboarding procedures; Authentik provisioning; SSH key distribution workflow Compliant — Cloud node access provisioned via Ansible playbook (SSH key deployment for Linux, domain join for Windows); AWS IAM role assignment documented; GCP service account grant process documented
6.2 Establish access revocation process Offboarding checklist; Authentik account deactivation; SSH key revocation (Ansible); Wazuh Active Response Compliant — Cloud node access revocation: SSH key removal via Ansible, Tailscale node key expiry/revocation, AWS IAM instance profile disassociation; cloud node termination as final revocation step
6.3 Require MFA for externally-exposed applications Authentik enforces MFA via TOTP; all external services require MFA Compliant — AWS console access enforces MFA via IAM policy; GCP console access requires Google account MFA; Azure portal access enforces MFA via Entra Conditional Access. Cloud node management interfaces (SSH/RDP) require Tailscale device authentication (device-bound key, no shared credential)
6.4 Require MFA for remote network access VPN (Tailscale) requires device authentication; SSH keys + optional passphrase Compliant — All cloud node management access routes through Tailscale WireGuard; Tailscale device authentication requires MFA at enrollment; no direct internet-facing management ports on any cloud node
6.5 Require MFA for administrative access 100% admin accounts require Authentik MFA; SSH key-based auth for privileged access Compliant — AWS IAM admin users require MFA (enforced via IAM policy); GCP admin access requires Google MFA; Azure subscription administrators enforce MFA via Entra Conditional Access
6.6 Establish authentication/authorization system inventory (IG2) Authentik, Active Directory, SSH key infrastructure documented; annual review Compliant — AWS IAM, GCP IAM, Azure Entra ID added to auth system inventory
6.7 Centralize access control (IG2) Authentik SSO for Traefik-routed services; Active Directory domain authentication Compliant — Linux cloud nodes centralized via Ansible-managed SSH keys; Windows cloud nodes centralized via Active Directory (domain-joined over Tailscale); cloud console access centralized via provider IAM with MFA
6.8 Define and maintain role-based access control (IG3) Not Implemented — Requires enterprise-wide RBAC documentation Action Required — RBAC documentation needed; AWS IAM instance profiles define EC2 role boundaries; GCP IAM service account roles defined; Azure RBAC role assignments documented per resource group. Formal RBAC matrix across all systems including cloud not yet documented

Control 6 Overall Status: Mostly Compliant; 6.8 needs broader RBAC documentation including cloud IAM roles


CIS Control 7: Continuous Vulnerability Management

Safeguard Requirement Implementation Notes
7.1 Establish vulnerability management process Documented dual-scanner approach (OpenVAS + Nessus); remediation SLAs; CVSS prioritization Compliant — Same CVSS-based SLAs (Critical <72h, High <7d) applied to cloud node findings from PatchMon, AWS Inspector, GCP SCC, and Azure Defender for Cloud; TheHive tracks cloud node vulnerabilities alongside on-premises findings
7.2 Establish remediation process Risk-based remediation strategy; documented SLAs; monthly reviews; TheHive tracking Compliant — Ansible update_linux_hosts.yml provides emergency patching for Linux cloud nodes via Tailscale; WSUS manages Windows cloud nodes; cloud-native remediation tools available as supplemental
7.3 Perform automated OS patch management PatchMon (Linux), WSUS (Windows), monthly cadence; automated approvals Compliant — WSUS manages Windows cloud nodes (AWS Windows Server 2025, Azure Windows Server 2025) with same approval workflow and schedule as on-premises Windows hosts. Ansible update_linux_hosts.yml patches Linux cloud nodes monthly via Tailscale
7.4 Perform automated application patch management Watchtower (containers), WUD monitoring, monthly cadence Compliant — Watchtower and WUD monitor container images on cloud nodes where Docker is deployed
7.5 Perform automated vulnerability scans — internal (IG2) Weekly OpenVAS (52/year); monthly Nessus authenticated scans (12/year) Compliant — Wazuh CIS SCA on all 8 cloud nodes daily; AWS Inspector; GCP SCC vulnerability assessment; Azure Defender for Cloud recommendations. Exceeds quarterly requirement; cloud scanning added
7.6 Perform automated vulnerability scans — external (IG2) Monthly Nessus scans of externally-exposed assets; OpenVAS external scans Compliant — AWS Inspector external-facing assessment; GCP SCC external threat detection; Azure Defender for Cloud internet-exposed resource assessment. No cloud management ports publicly exposed — attack surface is minimal
7.7 Remediate detected vulnerabilities (IG2) MTTR <72h (Critical); <7 days (High); 95% patched within SLA; verification scans Compliant — Same MTTR SLAs enforced across cloud nodes via PatchMon tracking; Ansible emergency patching available for Linux cloud nodes via Tailscale; WSUS auto-approval for critical Windows cloud node patches

Control 7 Overall Status: Fully Compliant — Exceeds industry standards; cloud node vulnerability management integrated


CIS Control 8: Audit Log Management

Safeguard Requirement Implementation Notes
8.1 Establish audit log management process Documented logging policy; 90-day retention; centralized SIEM; review procedures Compliant — Cloud audit logging policy extended to AWS CloudTrail, GCP Admin Activity, Azure Activity Log with 90-day retention requirement matched across all providers
8.2 Collect audit logs 100% security event coverage (DNS, SSH, Traefik, vulnerability scans, patches, Wazuh, Sysmon) Compliant — AWS CloudTrail collects all management events (delivered to S3 with SSE); GCP Admin Activity logs always-on; Azure Activity Log and Monitor collect all ARM deployments and resource changes; Wazuh agent on all 8 cloud nodes forwards endpoint security events to on-premises Splunk
8.3 Ensure adequate log storage SIEM storage capacity planning; immutable indexes; compressed archival Compliant — AWS S3 lifecycle policies manage CloudTrail log retention; Azure Log Analytics homelab-log workspace storage monitored; cloud-native log storage supplementary to on-premises SIEM
8.4 Standardize time synchronization (IG2) NTP sync across all assets; centralized time sources Compliant — All Linux cloud nodes configured with NTP (time.google.com, time.cloudflare.com) via Ansible; Windows cloud nodes sync via domain NTP policy; cloud provider hypervisors provide host-level time sync as a baseline
8.5 Collect detailed audit logs (IG2) Logs include timestamp, user, source IP, action, result, SSH key fingerprints, DNS query details Compliant — AWS CloudTrail includes IAM identity, source IP, user agent, request/response detail; GCP audit logs include principal identity, resource, method, source IP; Azure Activity Log includes caller identity, resource, operation, source IP
8.6 Collect DNS query logs (IG2) Unbound/Technitium DNS query logging; forwarded to SIEM Compliant — All cloud nodes resolve via on-premises Unbound resolvers (192.168.1.153/154) over Tailscale — DNS queries logged at Unbound and forwarded to SIEM; AWS Route 53 Resolver DNS query logging enabled for VPC; GCP Cloud DNS logging for internal queries
8.7 Collect URL request logs (IG2) Traefik access logs (JSON format); proxy logs; forwarded to SIEM Compliant — Cloud-hosted services log via Traefik or cloud-native application logging; GCP Cloud Armor access logs capture HTTP request details
8.8 Collect command-line logs (IG2) Sysmon Event ID 1 (process creation); PowerShell logging; Bash history; Wazuh command monitoring Compliant — Wazuh agents on all 8 cloud nodes collect process execution, command-line arguments, and shell history; Windows cloud nodes have Sysmon deployed with same configuration as on-premises Windows hosts; Bash audit logging via auditd on Linux cloud nodes
8.9 Centralize audit logs (IG2) Dual SIEM (Splunk + Elastic); syslog-ng encrypted forwarding; centralized storage Compliant — Wazuh Universal Forwarder from all 8 cloud nodes forwards to on-premises Splunk via Tailscale; AWS CloudTrail logs stored in S3 (provider-managed); GCP audit logs in Cloud Logging; Azure logs in homelab-log Log Analytics workspace; all cloud node endpoint events centralized in on-premises SIEM
8.10 Retain audit logs 90 days minimum (IG2) 90-day retention policy; immutable SIEM indexes Compliant — AWS S3 CloudTrail bucket lifecycle policy set to 90 days; GCP Cloud Logging default retention (400 days for admin activity); Azure Log Analytics homelab-log retention set to 90 days
8.11 Conduct audit log reviews weekly (IG2) Splunk dashboards; Wazuh alerts; weekly correlation searches; automated reviews Compliant — AWS GuardDuty findings reviewed as generated (real-time); GCP SCC security health findings reviewed monthly; Azure Sentinel dashboard includes cloud node events
8.12 Collect service provider logs (IG3) Partial — IaaS cloud audit logging comprehensive (AWS CloudTrail, GCP Admin Activity, Azure Activity Log); SaaS platform log collection limited IG3 Partial — IaaS cloud audit logging comprehensive; SaaS platform logging limited

Control 8 Overall Status: Fully Compliant (IG1/IG2) — Cloud audit logs integrated; IG3 improved with IaaS log coverage


CIS Control 9: Email and Web Browser Protections

Safeguard Requirement Implementation Notes
9.1 Ensure only fully supported browsers/email clients Latest browser versions enforced; unsupported clients blocked Compliant — Cloud nodes are servers; no browser/email client deployment on cloud instances
9.2 Use DNS filtering services Unbound integrated blocklists (1M+ blocked domains); malware/phishing domain blocking Compliant — All cloud nodes resolve via on-premises Unbound (192.168.1.153/154) over Tailscale, inheriting DNS-layer malware and phishing domain blocking
9.3 Maintain network-based URL filters (IG2) Traefik URL filtering; SafeLine WAF; category-based blocking; reputation filtering Compliant — GCP Cloud Armor application-level policy blocks malicious URL patterns; AWS Security Group egress rules restrict outbound destinations; Azure NSG outbound rules limit egress to documented management services
9.4 Restrict browser/email extensions (IG2) Partial — GPO restricts extensions on managed Windows devices; Linux/personal devices rely on user compliance Gap — Applies to endpoints; cloud nodes not affected
9.5 Implement DMARC (IG2) DMARC policy published; SPF + DKIM implemented for outbound mail Compliant
9.6 Block unnecessary file types (IG2) Partial — Email gateway blocks .exe/.scr/.bat attachments; not comprehensive Gap — Expand blocked file type list on email gateway
9.7 Deploy email server anti-malware (IG3) Not Implemented — No dedicated email gateway anti-malware Gap — IG3 N/A (no on-prem email server)

Control 9 Overall Status: IG1 Compliant; IG2 Partial; IG3 N/A. Cloud DNS filtering extended to all cloud nodes.


CIS Control 10: Malware Defenses

Safeguard Requirement Implementation Notes
10.1 Deploy and maintain anti-malware software Wazuh FIM + VirusTotal integration; ClamAV; Microsoft Defender; rootkit detection Compliant — Wazuh FIM and rootkit detection deployed on all 8 cloud nodes; ClamAV on Linux cloud nodes (Amazon Linux 2, Debian 13.4, Ubuntu 24.04 LTS); Microsoft Defender active on Windows Server 2025 (AWS, Azure); GuardDuty, SCC, Azure Defender for Cloud provide cloud-native behavioral detection
10.2 Configure automatic anti-malware signature updates Automated signature updates (daily); ClamAV freshclam; Defender definition updates Compliant — ClamAV freshclam runs on Linux cloud nodes; Windows Defender definitions updated via WSUS on Windows cloud nodes; cloud-native tools update threat intelligence automatically
10.3 Disable autorun/autoplay for removable media GPO disables autorun; Linux udev rules block autoplay; verified compliance Compliant — Cloud nodes have no removable media
10.4 Configure automatic scanning of removable media (IG2) Wazuh FIM monitors USB insertions; ClamAV on-access scanning Compliant — Cloud nodes have no removable media; not applicable
10.5 Enable anti-exploitation features (IG2) Windows DEP/WDEG enabled; Linux ASLR/PIE; macOS SIP/Gatekeeper Compliant — Linux cloud nodes have ASLR enabled (enforced via Ansible sysctl hardening); Windows cloud nodes (Windows Server 2025) have DEP, ASLR, and Control Flow Guard enabled by default
10.6 Centrally manage anti-malware software (IG2) Wazuh central management; Group Policy for Windows Defender; centralized config Compliant — Wazuh manager (192.168.1.219) centrally manages all cloud node agents; Windows cloud nodes managed via Group Policy over Tailscale domain connection
10.7 Use behavior-based anti-malware (IG2) Wazuh behavioral analysis; Windows Defender behavior monitoring; Suricata IDS behavioral detection Compliant — AWS GuardDuty ML-based behavioral detection; GCP SCC threat detection; Azure Defender for Cloud behavioral analytics all provide cloud-native behavioral malware detection independent of signature databases

Control 10 Overall Status: Fully Compliant — Anti-malware coverage extended to all cloud nodes; cloud-native behavioral detection supplements on-premises


CIS Control 11: Data Recovery

Safeguard Requirement Implementation Notes
11.1 Establish and maintain data recovery process Documented backup procedures; restore workflows; recovery prioritization; annual reviews Compliant — Cloud recovery procedures added: ARM template (Azure), Ansible new_install_baseline_roles.yml, and Tailscale re-enrollment documented as cloud node rebuild runbooks; RTO target <2hr for cloud nodes
11.2 Perform automated backups Proxmox automated backups (bi-weekly); Docker volume backups; database backups Compliant — Cloud node OS-level backups via provider snapshots (AWS EBS snapshots, GCP disk snapshots, Azure VM snapshots); application data backed up to on-premises PBS/NAS via Tailscale where applicable
11.3 Protect recovery data Encrypted backups (AES-256); offsite storage; access controls; encrypted transmission Compliant — AWS EBS snapshots encrypted (account default KMS key); GCP disk snapshots encrypted at rest; Azure VM snapshots encrypted; all cloud snapshot access controlled via provider IAM
11.4 Establish isolated instance of recovery data Offsite backups (cloud + offline USB); air-gapped backup copies; versioned backups Compliant — Cloud node rebuild from code (Git + Ansible) provides infrastructure-as-code recovery path independent of backup images; Tailscale pre-authorized keys stored offline for re-enrollment
11.5 Test data recovery (IG2) Quarterly restore testing; documented test results; validation procedures Compliant — Azure Spot instance eviction scenario tested (Deallocate policy, restart procedure documented); AWS EC2 stop/start tested; GCP Compute stop/start tested; Ansible cloud node rebuild timing validated against <2hr RTO target

Control 11 Overall Status: Fully Compliant — Cloud node recovery procedures documented and tested


CIS Control 12: Network Infrastructure Management

Safeguard Requirement Implementation Notes
12.1 Ensure network infrastructure is up-to-date Network device patch management; monthly version checks; automated update notifications Compliant — AWS VPC, GCP VPC, and Azure VNet are provider-managed infrastructure (automatically patched by provider); Tailscale client updated via package manager on all cloud nodes
12.2 Establish secure network architecture (IG2) Documented network architecture; segmentation design; least-privilege network design Compliant — Cloud architecture documented: Tailscale mesh routing tables (9 enrolled nodes), per-provider VPC/VNet CIDR allocations, subnet router configurations, and cloud-to-on-premises routing tables. No cloud management ports publicly exposed; default-deny posture on all cloud firewall configurations
12.3 Securely manage network infrastructure (IG2) SSH key-based management; HTTPS-only interfaces; IaC version control (Git) Compliant — Cloud network infrastructure (Security Groups, VPC firewall policy, NSG rules) managed via Terraform IaC and version-controlled in Git; no console-based ad-hoc changes
12.4 Establish architecture diagrams (IG2) Network topology diagrams; Subnet/VLAN documentation; NetAlertX networking mapping Compliant — Cloud diagrams added: Tailscale node inventory (9 nodes with Tailscale IPs and roles), subnet advertisement table (pfSense, AWS, GCP, Azure subnet routers), cloud-to-on-premises routing documentation, per-provider VPC/VNet topology
12.5 Centralize network AAA (IG2) Not Implemented — Lab does not have a dedicated AAA service deployed for on-premises network devices Gap — Traditional AAA not deployed; Tailscale ACL policy serves as de-facto AAA for cloud node access (device-bound authentication, per-node authorization rules, access logging); provides partial compensating control for cloud
12.6 Use secure network protocols (IG2) 802.1X port security (planned); WPA3 wireless; TLS 1.3; SSH v2 only Compliant — All cloud management communication via Tailscale WireGuard (ChaCha20-Poly1305); SSH v2 AES-256-GCM enforced on all Linux cloud nodes via Ansible; TLS 1.3 for all cloud-hosted HTTPS services
12.7 Ensure remote devices use VPN + AAA (IG2) Tailscale mesh VPN requires device authentication; Cloudflare Tunnels; no direct internet exposure Compliant — All cloud nodes connected exclusively via Tailscale WireGuard; no public management ports; cloud nodes access on-premises management stack via Tailscale; device-bound key authentication enforced
12.8 Establish dedicated admin workstations (IG3) Partial — Dedicated admin VM; not fully air-gapped from internet Gap — Implement fully isolated admin workstation

Control 12 Overall Status: IG1/IG2 Compliant — Cloud network architecture integrated; 12.5 AAA gap remains; IG3 Partial


CIS Control 13: Network Monitoring and Defense

Safeguard Requirement Implementation Notes
13.1 Centralize security event alerting (IG2) Dual SIEM (Splunk + Elastic); TheHive case management; Discord/email alerting Compliant — AWS GuardDuty findings → CloudWatch Events → SNS; GCP SCC findings → alerting policies; Azure Sentinel KQL detection rules → automated incident creation → Shuffle SOAR webhook → on-premises TheHive case creation. All cloud security events also forwarded to on-premises Splunk via Wazuh agents
13.2 Deploy host-based IDS (IG2) Wazuh EDR on 25+ on-premises endpoints; FIM monitoring; rootkit detection; process monitoring Compliant — Wazuh EDR deployed on all 8 cloud nodes (same configuration as on-premises) providing FIM, rootkit detection, CIS SCA, vulnerability assessment, and process monitoring
13.3 Deploy network IDS (IG2) Suricata (IPS inline); Snort (IDS passive); CrowdSec (behavioral) Compliant — AWS GuardDuty analyzes VPC flow logs for network-based threat patterns; GCP network IDS endpoint configured for gcp-debian-host1 mirroring traffic at high severity threshold; Azure Sentinel NSG flow log analysis detects network anomalies
13.4 Perform traffic filtering between segments (IG2) pfSense/OPNsense inter-VLAN ACLs; firewall rules per segment; default-deny policies Compliant — AWS Security Groups enforce default-deny; GCP VPC firewall policy (homelab) with Google Threat Intelligence blocking (TOR exit nodes, malicious IPs, sanctioned countries); Azure NSG homelab-nsg2 applies explicit allow-list with DenyAllInBound and DenyAllOutBound defaults
13.5 Manage access control for remote assets (IG2) NAC principles applied; Tailscale device posture checks; Wazuh agent compliance verification Compliant — Tailscale ACL policy enforces per-device/per-subnet explicit allow rules (default deny for all inter-node traffic); Wazuh agent compliance verification extended to all 8 cloud nodes
13.6 Collect network traffic flow logs (IG2) pfSense/OPNsense flow logs; Suricata EVE JSON; packet captures (tcpdump); SIEM ingestion Compliant — AWS VPC flow logs (fl-03179f74e54bf1aa4 → CloudWatch Logs) capturing all accepted/rejected traffic; GCP VPC flow logs enabled on default network (Flow Analyzer); Azure NSG flow logs via Network Watcher (homelab-nsg2); Tailscale tunnel telemetry supplements provider flow data
13.7 Deploy host-based IPS (IG3) Wazuh Active Response (firewall-drop, host-deny); EDR blocking capabilities Compliant — Wazuh Active Response executes on cloud nodes via Tailscale — same containment playbooks as on-premises (firewall-drop via iptables/UFW on Linux, host-deny, account-disable)
13.8 Deploy network IPS (IG3) Suricata inline blocking mode; CrowdSec automated firewall rules; pfSense IPS integration Compliant — GCP Cloud Armor application-level policy provides WAF blocking (SQLi/XSS via preconfigured expression sets v33-stable) and DDoS rate limiting; AWS Security Group acts as stateful IPS at the VPC perimeter; Azure DDoS Protection plan (homelab-ddos) protects Azure VNet
13.9 Deploy port-level access control (IG3) Not Implemented — Network switching replacement required Gap — Implement 802.1X NAC for on-premises; cloud nodes not applicable (no physical switchports)
13.10 Perform application layer filtering (IG3) SafeLine WAF (OWASP CRS rules); Traefik middleware filtering; NGINX Ingress rules Compliant — GCP Cloud Armor three-tier application-level WAF (edge policy, backend policy, application-level policy with SQLi/XSS blocking)
13.11 Tune security event alerting thresholds (IG3) Monthly tuning of Splunk/Wazuh/Suricata thresholds; false positive reduction tracking Compliant — AWS GuardDuty finding suppression rules configured for known-good activity; GCP SCC security marks used to suppress known-good findings; Azure Sentinel analytics rule tuning via scheduled review

Control 13 Overall Status: IG2 Fully Compliant; IG3 Mostly Compliant (802.1X gap for on-premises only; cloud nodes well-covered by provider controls)


CIS Control 14: Security Awareness and Skills Training

All safeguards (14.1-14.9): N/A — Single-user lab environment


CIS Control 15: Service Provider Management

Safeguard Requirement Implementation Notes
15.1 Establish service provider inventory Cloud providers documented Compliant — Inventory updated: AWS (us-east-2, 2 EC2 instances, GuardDuty + Security Hub enabled), Azure (North Central US, 2 VMs, Defender for Cloud + Sentinel enabled), GCP (us-central1, 2 Compute instances, SCC + Cloud Armor enabled), Cloudflare (DNS, Tunnels, CDN, R2), Tailscale (WireGuard mesh VPN, 9 enrolled nodes), PIA (egress VPN). Security posture tools documented per provider
15.2–15.7 Additional safeguards N/A — Single-user lab environment N/A

Control 15 Overall Status: 15.1 Compliant — Service provider inventory expanded to include AWS, Azure, GCP; remainder N/A for single-user lab


CIS Control 16: Application Software Security

Safeguard Requirement Implementation Notes
16.1 Establish secure application development process (IG2) Informal — IaC follows security best practices; no formal SDLC documentation Gap — ARM templates and Ansible playbooks follow security-by-default patterns; cloud node provisioning IaC reviewed before apply
16.2 Establish vulnerability disclosure process (IG2) N/A — Single-user lab environment N/A
16.3 Perform root cause analysis on vulnerabilities (IG2) Informal — Post-incident reviews conducted; no formal RCA process Gap — Document RCA procedures
16.4 Establish third-party software component inventory (IG2) Partial — Docker images tracked; no comprehensive SBOM tracking Gap — Cloud node base images (AMIs, GCP images, Azure Marketplace images) tracked by version; no formal SBOM for cloud node packages. Trivy/Grype SBOM implementation planned Q1 2026
16.5 Use up-to-date third-party components (IG2) Watchtower auto-updates; WUD monitoring; trusted sources (official Docker images) Compliant — Cloud node base OS images kept current via PatchMon/WSUS; provider-maintained base images (Amazon Linux 2, Ubuntu, Debian) used — security patches available same-day
16.6 Establish vulnerability severity rating system (IG2) CVSS scoring; risk-based prioritization; documented remediation SLAs Compliant — Same CVSS-based severity rating and SLAs applied to cloud node findings from Wazuh, Inspector, SCC, and Defender for Cloud
16.7 Use standard hardening templates (IG2) CIS Benchmarks for application infrastructure; IaC templates (Ansible/Terraform) Compliant — Same CIS Benchmark hardening templates applied to cloud Linux nodes via Ansible; Wazuh SCA validates compliance against CIS Amazon Linux, CIS Debian, CIS Ubuntu, and CIS Windows Server 2025 policies
16.8–16.9 Production separation; developer training N/A — Single-user lab environment N/A
16.10 Apply secure design principles (IG2) Least privilege; input validation; defense-in-depth architecture; secure defaults Compliant — Cloud nodes provisioned with no public management ports (secure default); IAM least-privilege; provider-native security services enabled by default (GuardDuty, SCC, Defender for Cloud)
16.11 Leverage vetted security modules (IG2) Authentik (IAM); Step-CA (PKI); Traefik (reverse proxy); trusted open-source security libraries Compliant — Provider-managed security services (AWS GuardDuty, GCP SCC, Azure Defender for Cloud) used — all are vetted, maintained security modules
16.12 Implement code-level security checks (IG3) Limited — Infrastructure code linting (Ansible-lint/Terraform validate); no comprehensive SAST/DAST Gap — No automated SAST scanning of IaC
16.13 Conduct application penetration testing (IG3) Informal — Vulnerability scanning covers web apps; Kali/Parrot OS pen testing Gap — Formal pen testing (IG3); cloud scope not included in informal testing
16.14 Conduct threat modeling (IG3) Informal — Security architecture design considers threats; no formal STRIDE/DREAD modeling Gap — Document threat models (IG3) including cloud attack surface

Control 16 Overall Status: IG2 Mostly Compliant (infrastructure focus); IG3 Partial; cloud scope integrated where applicable


CIS Control 17: Incident Response Management

Safeguard Requirement Implementation Notes
17.1 Designate incident handling personnel N/A — Single-user lab environment N/A
17.2 Establish contact information for reporting Discord channels; SMTP relay; Cloudflare email routing Compliant — AWS SNS notifications, GCP alerting policy notifications, and Azure Monitor action group (RecommendedAlertRules-AG-1) integrated into notification chain
17.3 Establish enterprise incident reporting process TheHive case creation process; reporting timeframes defined; multi-channel reporting (Discord, email, API) Compliant — AWS GuardDuty findings and Azure Sentinel incidents automatically create TheHive cases via Shuffle SOAR webhook; GCP SCC findings trigger alerting policy notifications
17.4 Establish incident response process (IG2) Documented IR plan; TheHive playbooks Compliant — Cloud node IR: Wazuh Active Response (firewall-drop, host-deny, account-disable) on cloud nodes via Tailscale; AWS Security Group modification for isolation; GCP/Azure firewall rule update for cloud node containment. Runbooks documented
17.5 Assign key roles and responsibilities (IG2) N/A — Single-user lab environment N/A
17.6 Define communication mechanisms (IG2) Primary: Discord; Secondary: SMTP/Cloudflare email routing; multi-path redundancy Compliant — AWS SNS, GCP alerting policies, Azure Monitor action group feed Discord/email channels
17.7–17.8 IR exercises; post-incident reviews N/A — Single-user lab environment N/A
17.9 Establish incident thresholds (IG3) Severity matrix documented; CVSS thresholds; Splunk alert severities; MISP threat levels; Prometheus thresholds Compliant — AWS GuardDuty severity (High/Medium/Low); GCP SCC severity ratings; Azure Sentinel analytics rule severity levels — all mapped to same severity matrix

Control 17 Overall Status: Mostly Compliant; limited IR playbooks and SOAR workflows for both on-premises and cloud workloads.


CIS Control 18: Penetration Testing

Safeguard Requirement Implementation Notes
18.1 Establish penetration testing program (IG2) Informal — Vulnerability scanning exceeds pen testing frequency; no formal pen testing engagement Gap — Cloud node attack surface is minimal (no public management ports); cloud-native threat detection provides continuous threat detection equivalent to some pen testing functions
18.2 Perform external penetration tests annually (IG2) Informal — Weekly OpenVAS/monthly Nessus scans; no dedicated external pen test Gap — Cloud public IPs (used only for Tailscale UDP handshake) represent minimal external attack surface; no cloud management ports internet-exposed
18.3 Remediate penetration test findings (IG2) Vulnerability remediation process covers pen test findings; documented remediation workflows Compliant — Process exists; same remediation SLAs and TheHive tracking applied to any cloud findings
18.4 Validate security measures post-test (IG3) Informal — Re-scanning validates remediation; no formal security control validation Gap — Post-remediation validation testing needed
18.5 Perform internal penetration tests annually (IG3) Informal — No formal internal pen testing; local scanning, enumeration, and vulnerability testing conducted Gap — IG3 requirement; cloud nodes should be included in scope

Control 18 Overall Status: IG2 Partial (vulnerability scanning substitutes); IG3 Not Implemented. Cloud minimal attack surface noted.


Summary of Compliance Status

Overall CIS Controls v8.1.2 Compliance — v2.0 (April 2026)

Implementation Group Controls Fully Compliant Controls Partially Compliant Controls Not Implemented Overall Score
IG1 (56 safeguards) 52 (93%) 4 (7%) 0 (0%) 93% Compliant
IG2 (74 additional safeguards) 60 (81%) 12 (16%) 2 (3%) 81% Compliant
IG3 (29 additional safeguards) 15 (52%) 8 (28%) 6 (20%) 52% Compliant

Note: Compliance scores unchanged from v1.0. Cloud integration strengthens evidence for existing compliant safeguards but does not introduce new gaps or close existing open items in IG2/IG3.