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NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Framework

Document Control:
Version: 2.0
Last Updated: April 2026
Owner: Paul Leone
Framework Version: NIST SP 800-53 Revision 5


Overview

324+ individual requirements across 18 control families. Strong compliance in technical families (AC, AU, IA, SC, SI) at 85%+ implementation. Version 2.0 integrates cloud workload coverage across AWS, GCP, and Azure — 6 nodes total connected via Tailscale WireGuard mesh VPN. Cloud-native security services (GuardDuty, Security Command Center, Defender for Cloud/Sentinel) augment on-premises controls across all relevant families.

Overall Maturity: High (Technical Controls) / Moderate (Administrative Controls)

Tier Families Rationale
Tier 4 (Adaptive) AU, IA, SI, CM Automated correlation, PKI automation, multi-layered detection including NSM and cloud-native tools, IaC drift detection
Tier 3 (Defined) AC, IR, RA, SC Documented policies, centralized enforcement, behavioral monitoring, cloud boundary protection
Tier 2 (Managed) CP, CA, MA Scheduled scanning, restore testing, change control
N/A PE, PS, PM, PL, MP Constrained by single-user homelab context

Access Control (AC) — 90% Compliant (27/30 Implemented)

Control Control Name Implementation Status Notes
AC-1 Policy and Procedures Lab mission statement defines security-first architecture; documented access control requirements Implemented
AC-2 Account Management Authentik user lifecycle management; SSH individual user accounts; Wazuh tracks active sessions; no shared credentials Implemented Cloud: Linux cloud node accounts managed via Ansible SSH key distribution; Windows cloud nodes managed via Active Directory (domain-joined over Tailscale); cloud IAM service accounts inventoried with minimal role assignments
AC-2(1) Automated System Account Management Authentik automated provisioning/deprovisioning Implemented
AC-2(3) Disable Accounts Authentik automated account disabling after 90 days inactivity Partial Cloud: AWS IAM access keys reviewed quarterly (no long-lived keys on EC2 — instance profiles used); GCP IAM recommender audits service accounts; Azure Entra ID accounts subject to 45-day dormancy policy
AC-2(4) Automated Audit Actions SIEM tracks all account creation/modification/deletion Implemented Cloud: CloudTrail, GCP Admin Activity, Azure Activity Log capture all cloud IAM events
AC-2(5) Inactivity Logout Authentik 30-min idle timeout; SSH ClientAliveInterval=300 Implemented
AC-2(7) Privileged User Accounts Separate admin accounts; monitored via SIEM; MFA enforced Implemented Cloud: AWS IAM instance profiles scoped to minimum required actions; GCP service accounts use minimal roles; Azure subscription admin access MFA-enforced via Entra Conditional Access
AC-2(12) Account Monitoring Atypical Usage Splunk behavioral analysis; unusual login times/geoIP tracking Partial Cloud: Azure Sentinel KQL rule detects sign-in from new geographic location; GuardDuty CredentialAccess findings; GCP SCC IAM anomaly detection
AC-2(13) Disable High-Risk Accounts Wazuh Active Response disables compromised accounts Implemented Cloud: Wazuh Active Response (disable-account) executes on cloud nodes via Tailscale using same playbooks as on-premises
AC-3 Access Enforcement Authentik/AD RBAC groups; SSH sudo enforcement; Traefik middleware access control Implemented Cloud: Tailscale ACL policy enforces per-device/per-subnet explicit allow rules (default deny for all inter-node traffic)
AC-3(7) Role-Based Access Control Authentik groups map to application permissions; AD OUs for Windows Implemented
AC-3(8) Revocation of Access Centralized SSH key revocation via Ansible; Authentik account deactivation Implemented Cloud: Tailscale node key revocation; AWS IAM role disassociation; GCP service account removal; Azure Entra ID account deactivation — all documented in decommissioning runbook
AC-6 Least Privilege SSH sudo policies; Authentik role-based permissions; minimal access granted Implemented Cloud: AWS IAM instance profiles (no wildcard actions); GCP minimal role assignments (no owner/editor on Compute); Azure RBAC scoped per resource group
AC-6(1) Authorize Access to Security Functions Security tool access restricted to SOC role; documented in Authentik Implemented
AC-6(2) Non-Privileged Access for Non-Security Functions Standard user accounts for daily operations Implemented
AC-6(5) Privileged Accounts Separate privileged accounts; monitored; MFA enforced Implemented
AC-6(9) Log Use of Privileged Functions All sudo commands logged to SIEM; Windows privileged operations audited Implemented Cloud: cloud console admin actions logged via CloudTrail, GCP Audit Logs, Azure Activity Log
AC-7 Unsuccessful Logon Attempts SSH MaxAuthTries=5; Authentik lockout after 5 failures; Wazuh active-response Implemented
AC-8 System Use Notification SSH banner configured; Authentik login notice Implemented
AC-12 Session Termination Authentik session timeout; SSH automatic disconnect Implemented
AC-17 Remote Access SSH hardening; IP restrictions (firewall + Traefik); MFA for admin access; Tailscale VPN Implemented Cloud: SSH (Linux) and RDP (Windows) restricted to homelab subnets (192.168.0.0/16) via AWS Security Groups, GCP VPC firewall policy, Azure NSG; all management traffic routed through Tailscale WireGuard with no public internet exposure
AC-17(1) Monitoring and Control VPN connections logged; SSH sessions monitored; Traefik access logs Implemented Cloud: Tailscale tunnel telemetry; cloud provider flow logs (VPC flow logs, NSG flow logs) supplement on-premises monitoring
AC-17(2) Protection via Encryption SSH AES-256-GCM; TLS 1.3 (Traefik); Tailscale WireGuard Implemented Cloud: all cloud management traffic via Tailscale WireGuard (ChaCha20-Poly1305); no plaintext management paths
AC-17(4) Privileged Commands via Remote Access Privileged SSH sessions logged separately; sudo usage tracked Implemented
AC-17(9) Disconnect or Disable Access Remote access can be disabled via firewall rules; Tailscale ACLs Partial Cloud: Tailscale node key revocation immediately removes cloud node access; provider-native Security Group/NSG modification available for emergency lockout
AC-17(10) Authenticate Remote Commands SSH key-based authentication; command verification via logging Implemented

Audit and Accountability (AU) — 100% Compliant (18/18 Implemented)

Control Control Name Implementation Status Notes
AU-1 Policy and Procedures Comprehensive logging policy documented; 100% security event coverage requirement Implemented Cloud: cloud audit logging policy extended to AWS CloudTrail, GCP Admin Activity, Azure Activity Log with 90-day retention requirement matched across all providers
AU-2 Event Logging DNS queries, SSH sessions, Traefik requests, patch events, scan activity, Wazuh events logged Implemented Cloud: AWS CloudTrail (all management events to S3 with SSE); GCP Admin Activity logs (always-on) and Data Access audit logs; Azure Activity Log and Monitor; Wazuh agents on all 6 cloud nodes forward endpoint security events to on-premises Splunk
AU-3 Content of Audit Records Logs include: timestamp, user, source IP, action, result; Wazuh includes file hashes, process trees Implemented Cloud: CloudTrail includes IAM identity, source IP, user agent, request/response detail; GCP audit logs include principal identity, resource, method, source IP; Azure Activity Log includes caller identity, resource, operation
AU-3(1) Additional Audit Information SSH key fingerprints, DNS query details, Traefik request/response, Sysmon process telemetry Implemented
AU-4 Audit Log Storage Capacity 90-day retention; auto-archival to cold storage; capacity monitoring via Prometheus Implemented Cloud: AWS S3 lifecycle policy (90-day); GCP Cloud Logging retention per GCP defaults (400 days for admin activity); Azure Log Analytics homelab-log retention set to 90 days
AU-5 Response to Audit Logging Process Failures SIEM alerts on logging failures; redundant log paths (local + remote) Implemented Cloud: Azure Sentinel AMA data gap detection rule alerts when cloud agent heartbeat absent for 15+ minutes
AU-5(1) Storage Capacity Warning Prometheus/Pulse alerts at 80% capacity; automated archival triggers Implemented
AU-5(2) Real-Time Alerts Splunk/Elastic real-time correlation; Wazuh instant alerts; sub-60s notification latency Implemented
AU-6 Audit Record Review Splunk/Elastic dashboards (DNS/SSH/Traefik); automated correlation; vulnerability trending Implemented Cloud: CloudWatch Alarms (AWS), GCP Cloud Monitoring alerting policies, Azure Monitor alert rules (7 active VM metric alerts); all feed Discord/email notification channels
AU-6(1) Automated Process Integration SIEM correlation across Splunk/Elastic/Wazuh; TheHive case aggregation; n8n/Shuffle workflows Implemented
AU-6(3) Correlate Audit Record Repositories Multi-source correlation: Splunk + Elastic + Wazuh + network logs; unified timeline analysis Implemented Cloud: Wazuh agents on all 6 cloud nodes forward endpoint events to on-premises Splunk for unified cross-environment correlation
AU-6(5) Integrated Analysis Cortex multi-engine analysis; MISP threat intelligence; Shuffle enrichment pipelines Implemented
AU-7 Audit Record Reduction Splunk SPL queries; Elastic KQL; Wazuh filters; automated report generation Implemented
AU-7(1) Automatic Processing Scheduled Splunk searches; Elastic detection rules; automated dashboards Implemented
AU-9 Protection of Audit Information Logs forwarded to immutable SIEM; Splunk read-only indexes; syslog-ng TLS encryption; Elastic immutable streams Implemented Cloud: AWS S3 CloudTrail bucket with SSE; GCP Admin Activity logs (cannot be disabled); Azure Log Analytics immutable data retention
AU-11 Audit Record Retention 90-day hot retention; 1-year cold storage; automated lifecycle management Implemented Cloud: all cloud audit sources maintain 90-day minimum retention matching on-premises SIEM policy
AU-12 Audit Record Generation Universal Forwarders (30+ hosts); Elastic Agents; Wazuh agents (31+ including 6 cloud); structured JSON format Implemented Cloud: Wazuh agents on all 6 cloud nodes; AWS CloudTrail; GCP Audit Logs; Azure Monitor all feed on-premises Splunk indexer
AU-12(1) System-Wide Audit Trail Centralized logging across all infrastructure; time-correlated via NTP (SC-45) Implemented Cloud: cloud nodes NTP-synced (time.google.com, time.cloudflare.com via Ansible) ensuring consistent timestamps across on-premises and cloud audit trails
AU-12(2) Standardized Formats JSON/CEF formats; normalized in SIEM; CIM-compliant (Splunk) Implemented

Assessment, Authorization, and Monitoring (CA) — 80% Compliant (8/10 Implemented)

Control Control Name Implementation Status Notes
CA-1 Policy and Procedures Assessment and authorization policy documented; continuous monitoring strategy defined Implemented
CA-2 Control Assessments Weekly OpenVAS scans; monthly Nessus authenticated scans; CIS Benchmark audits; Wazuh SCA Implemented Cloud: Wazuh CIS SCA on all 6 cloud nodes daily; AWS Inspector, GCP SCC vulnerability assessment, Azure Defender for Cloud recommendations provide supplemental cloud-native assessment
CA-2(1) Independent Assessors N/A — Single user homelab N/A
CA-3 Information Exchange Documented interconnections; firewall rules for external connections Partial Cloud: Tailscale mesh topology documented; VPC/VNet CIDR allocations and subnet router configurations documented
CA-5 Plan of Action and Milestones Vulnerability tracking in TheHive; remediation SLAs documented Partial Cloud: cloud node findings tracked in same TheHive instance as on-premises; Critical <72h, High <7d MTTR SLAs apply to cloud scope
CA-6 Authorization N/A — Single user homelab N/A
CA-7 Continuous Monitoring Automated vulnerability scanning; real-time patch status; security posture dashboards; Wazuh real-time FIM Implemented Cloud: AWS GuardDuty (VPC flow, CloudTrail, DNS — real-time ML detection), GCP SCC (asset inventory, vulnerability assessment, network IDS endpoint), Azure Defender for Cloud (CSPM Secure Score) and Sentinel (KQL detection rules, automated response); all integrated with on-premises SIEM via Wazuh agent telemetry
CA-7(3) Trend Analyses Grafana dashboards track vulnerability trends over time Implemented Cloud: PatchMon cloud patch compliance trending; AWS Security Hub score trending; GCP SCC findings trend; Azure Defender for Cloud Secure Score monitored
CA-8 Penetration Testing Informal testing — scanning, enumeration, vulnerability assessments Partial
CA-9 Internal System Connections Network diagram documents internal connections; firewall rules enforce segmentation; NetAlert mapping Implemented Cloud: Tailscale mesh routing tables, VPC/VNet topology, and cloud-to-on-premises routing documented

Configuration Management (CM) — 95% Compliant (15/16 Implemented)

Control Control Name Implementation Status Notes
CM-1 Policy and Procedures Configuration management policy documented; IaC standards defined Implemented
CM-2 Baseline Configuration Ansible playbooks define baselines; PatchMon baseline tracking; CIS Benchmark baselines audited via Nessus Implemented Cloud: Ansible linux_hardening.yml and new_install_baseline_roles.yml applied to all 4 Linux cloud nodes; Windows cloud nodes managed via GPO (domain-joined); Azure ARM template version-controlled in Git
CM-2(2) Automation Support Ansible automation; Terraform IaC; automated baseline verification Implemented Cloud: Terraform manages AWS Security Groups, GCP VPC firewall policy, Azure NSG rules as IaC; Git commit required for all cloud network changes
CM-2(3) Retention of Previous Configurations Git version control; snapshot-before-patch; configuration history retained Implemented Cloud: cloud infrastructure change history in CloudTrail, GCP Audit Logs, Azure Activity Log; Terraform state versioned
CM-3 Configuration Change Control Snapshot-before-patch; WSUS approval workflows; pre-scan snapshots; Git pull requests Implemented Cloud: Terraform plan review required before cloud infrastructure changes; ARM template parameter validation before Azure deployment; no ad-hoc console changes
CM-3(2) Testing and Validation WSUS test deployments; Ansible dry-run; patch validation before production Implemented Cloud: Wazuh SCA post-rebuild validates CIS baseline compliance for cloud nodes; cloud node rebuild timing validated against RTO target
CM-5 Access Restrictions for Change Ansible playbook execution restricted; WSUS approval required; Git branch protection Implemented
CM-6 Configuration Settings CIS Benchmark compliance audits; hardened SSH/Traefik configs; configuration deviations detected Implemented Cloud: Wazuh SCA applies CIS benchmarks (CIS Amazon Linux, Debian 12/13, Ubuntu 22.04/24.04, Windows Server 2025) to all 6 cloud nodes daily
CM-6(1) Automated Management Ansible automation; configuration drift detection; automated remediation Implemented Cloud: Ansible drift detection runs against cloud nodes via Tailscale SSH; non-compliant findings trigger Discord alerts
CM-7 Least Functionality Unnecessary services disabled; verified via authenticated Nessus scans Implemented Cloud: cloud nodes provisioned with minimal base images; Wazuh SCA validates running services against CIS benchmarks on all 6 cloud nodes
CM-8 System Component Inventory PatchMon (5,000+ packages, 30+ hosts); WUD (50+ containers); OpenVAS/Nessus asset databases; Wazuh agent inventory (31+); NetAlert Inventory Implemented Cloud: 6 cloud nodes across AWS, GCP, Azure tracked in PatchMon, Wazuh (31+ agents), Checkmk, and Tailscale admin console (tailf07c05.ts.net). Per-provider instance IDs documented
CM-8(1) Updates During Install/Removal Inventory updated automatically and manually; Wazuh tracks software changes Implemented
CM-8(2) Automated Maintenance PatchMon daily updates; WUD container tracking; automated inventory reconciliation Implemented
CM-8(3) Automated Unauthorized Component Detection Nessus compliance scans detect unauthorized software; Wazuh FIM alerts on new executables; NetAlert new device notifications Implemented
CM-9 Configuration Management Plan IaC strategy documented; Ansible playbook standards; Git workflow defined Partial
CM-14 Signed Components Docker image signature verification (SHA-256); Step-CA signed certificates Implemented

Contingency Planning (CP) — 75% Compliant (6/8 Implemented)

Control Control Name Implementation Status Notes
CP-1 Policy and Procedures Backup procedures documented; failover strategies defined Partial
CP-9 System Backup Proxmox automated backups bi-weekly; encrypted backups; dual backup solutions Implemented Cloud: AWS EBS snapshots (encrypted); GCP disk snapshots (encrypted at rest); Azure VM snapshots (encrypted); cloud node rebuild from Git + Ansible provides IaC recovery path. Cloud node RTO <2hr validated
CP-9(1) Testing for Reliability Quarterly restore testing documented Implemented Cloud: Azure Spot instance eviction/restart scenario tested; cloud node Ansible rebuild timing validated
CP-9(3) Separate Storage Off-host encrypted backups; physically separate storage Implemented
CP-9(8) Cryptographic Protection Encrypted backups via Proxmox Backup Server Implemented Cloud: AWS S3 SSE; GCP persistent disk default encryption; Azure Managed Disk encryption
CP-10 System Recovery Documented restore procedures; IaC enables rapid rebuild Partial Cloud: cloud node rebuild runbooks (Tailscale enrollment, Wazuh agent reinstallation, Ansible baseline) documented and tested

Identification and Authentication (IA) — 95% Compliant (17/18 Implemented)

Control Control Name Implementation Status Notes
IA-1 Policy and Procedures Authentication policy documented; MFA requirements defined Implemented
IA-2 Identification and Authentication SSH keys; Authentik SSO; unique user identities required Implemented Cloud: Linux cloud nodes use SSH Ed25519 key-based authentication (passwords disabled globally via Ansible). Windows cloud nodes (AWS Windows Server 2025, Azure Windows Server 2025) domain-joined to home.com via Tailscale — Kerberos authentication, Group Policy, and WSUS extended to cloud
IA-2(1) MFA to Privileged Accounts Authentik TOTP enforced for all admin accounts; SSH key + passphrase Implemented Cloud: AWS console MFA enforced via IAM policy; GCP console requires Google MFA; Azure admin access enforced via Entra Conditional Access
IA-2(2) MFA to Non-Privileged Accounts Authentik TOTP available; SSH keys only (equivalent to 2FA) Implemented
IA-2(8) Replay Resistant SSH session tokens; Authentik session cookies with CSRF protection Implemented
IA-2(10) Single Sign-On Authentik SSO integration; Traefik ForwardAuth; OAuth2 provider Implemented
IA-3 Device Identification SSH host keys; device certificates via Step-CA Implemented Cloud: all 6 cloud nodes enrolled in Tailscale tailnet (tailf07c05.ts.net) with device-bound WireGuard keys serving as cryptographic device identifiers; Wazuh agent IDs provide device identity in SIEM
IA-4 Identifier Management Centralized user management via Authentik/AD; SSH keys tracked in Ansible Implemented Cloud: AWS IAM instance profiles, GCP service accounts, Azure Managed Identity inventoried; cloud node local user accounts tracked via Wazuh agent inventory
IA-5 Authenticator Management SSH keys managed via Ansible; Authentik credential policies; centralized key distribution Implemented Cloud: SSH key distribution to cloud nodes via Ansible new_install_baseline_roles.yml; quarterly key rotation playbook
IA-5(1) Password-Based Authentication SSH passwords disabled globally; Authentik enforces complexity requirements Implemented
IA-5(2) PKI-Based Authentication Step-CA two-tier PKI; SSH Ed25519 keys; automated certificate issuance Implemented
IA-5(7) No Embedded Unencrypted Authenticators Vaultwarden secrets management; Ansible Vault encrypted vars; no hardcoded credentials Implemented Cloud: no credentials embedded in cloud node configurations; Ansible Vault protects all cloud node credentials; cloud IAM uses instance profiles/service accounts (no hardcoded keys)
IA-5(14) Managing PKI Trust Stores Step-CA root/intermediate CA management; automated trust distribution Implemented
IA-5(18) Password Managers Vaultwarden deployed; biometric unlock; zero-knowledge encryption Implemented
IA-11 Re-authentication Authentik session timeout requires re-auth; SSH session timeout Implemented

Incident Response (IR) — 90% Compliant (11/13 Implemented)

Control Control Name Implementation Status Notes
IR-1 Policy and Procedures Incident response policy documented; SOC procedures defined Implemented
IR-4 Incident Handling TheHive case management; Wazuh Active Response; Splunk correlation; n8n/Shuffle SOAR orchestration Implemented Cloud: Wazuh Active Response (firewall-drop, host-deny, account-disable) executes on cloud nodes via Tailscale. AWS GuardDuty and Azure Sentinel incidents auto-create TheHive cases via Shuffle SOAR webhook. GCP SCC findings trigger alerting policy notifications
IR-4(1) Automated Incident Handling Wazuh Active Response (firewall-drop, host-deny); VirusTotal quarantine; Shuffle workflows; sub-30-min MTTR Implemented
IR-4(4) Information Correlation TheHive correlates Splunk/Wazuh/Suricata/scanners; Cortex enrichment; MISP threat context Implemented Cloud: cloud node Wazuh agent telemetry included in TheHive case correlation; GuardDuty finding types mapped to MITRE ATT&CK in Shuffle SOAR workflow
IR-5 Incident Monitoring Real-time SIEM dashboards; Discord notifications; TheHive case tracking; 100% security event visibility Implemented
IR-5(1) Automated Tracking TheHive automated case creation; Shuffle orchestration; Cortex job tracking; Wazuh forensic data collection Implemented
IR-6 Incident Reporting TheHive case documentation; Shuffle notifications; Discord/email alerting; Splunk executive reports Implemented
IR-6(1) Automated Reporting Shuffle automated notifications (Discord, email, PagerDuty); TheHive status updates; Splunk scheduled reports Implemented
IR-7 Incident Response Assistance TheHive knowledge base; documented playbooks (15+); Shuffle workflow library; Cortex analyzer catalog Implemented Cloud: cloud node IR runbooks (Tailscale containment, Security Group/NSG modification, Wazuh Active Response) documented
IR-8 Incident Response Plan Comprehensive IR plan; TheHive playbooks; Shuffle workflows; multi-channel alerting Implemented
IR-8(1) Breaches Limited — Wazuh automated alerting and active response; TheHive automated case creation Partial

Maintenance (MA) — 60% Compliant (4/6 Implemented)

Control Control Name Implementation Status Notes
MA-1 Policy and Procedures Maintenance policy informal — personal lab environment Partial
MA-2 Controlled Maintenance Change control via Git; snapshot-before-patch Partial
MA-3 Maintenance Tools Ansible automation tools version controlled Partial
MA-4 Nonlocal Maintenance SSH remote maintenance logged; session monitoring Implemented Cloud: all cloud node maintenance via SSH over Tailscale with session logging; Windows cloud node maintenance via RDP over Tailscale; all maintenance actions logged via CloudTrail/GCP Audit Logs/Azure Activity Log
MA-4(6) Cryptographic Protection SSH encryption for remote maintenance; TLS for web-based tools Implemented Cloud: all cloud maintenance traffic encrypted via Tailscale WireGuard (ChaCha20-Poly1305)
MA-6 Timely Maintenance Patch SLAs defined and tracked Partial Cloud: same Critical <72h, High <7d MTTR SLAs applied to cloud nodes; PatchMon dashboard tracks cloud patch compliance

Media Protection (MP) — 40% Compliant

Control Control Name Implementation Status Notes
MP-4 Media Storage Backup media stored securely; encrypted Implemented
MP-7 Media Use Removable media disabled via GPO (Windows) Partial

Physical and Environmental Protection (PE) — N/A (Residential Homelab)

Control Control Name Implementation Status Notes
PE-9 Power Equipment and Cabling UPS battery backup for critical systems N/A Cloud: physical infrastructure managed by cloud provider (AWS, GCP, Azure maintain SOC 2 certified data centers)
PE-11 Emergency Power UPS provides temporary power N/A

Planning (PL) — 60% Compliant

Control Control Name Implementation Status Notes
PL-2 System Security Plans GRC documentation serves as security plan Implemented
PL-8 Security Architecture Defense-in-depth architecture documented; network diagrams maintained Implemented Cloud: multi-cloud hybrid architecture documented in GRC documents; Tailscale mesh topology, VPC/VNet diagrams, and routing tables maintained
PL-8(1) Defense in Depth Multi-layer security controls across network/application/data layers Implemented

Program Management (PM) — 40% Compliant

Control Control Name Implementation Status Notes
PM-5 System Inventory Comprehensive asset inventory maintained (PatchMon, Wazuh, OpenVAS, Nessus, NetAlert) Implemented Cloud: 6 cloud nodes tracked in PatchMon, Wazuh (31+ agents), Checkmk, and Tailscale admin console
PM-9 Risk Management Strategy Risk-based vulnerability prioritization; CVSS scoring Implemented
PM-16(1) Automated Threat Intelligence Sharing MISP automated feed synchronization; Shuffle vulnerability aggregation Implemented Cloud: AWS GuardDuty, GCP SCC, Azure Sentinel findings available to MISP for IOC correlation

Risk Assessment (RA) — 85% Compliant (10/12 Implemented)

Control Control Name Implementation Status Notes
RA-1 Policy and Procedures Risk assessment policy documented; CVSS scoring methodology defined Implemented
RA-3 Risk Assessment CVSS scoring of vulnerabilities; exploit likelihood assessment; risk-based remediation prioritization Implemented Cloud: same CVSS-based risk assessment applied to cloud node findings from PatchMon, AWS Inspector, GCP SCC, Azure Defender for Cloud
RA-3(1) Supply Chain Risk Assessment MISP vendor compromise tracking; limited supply chain visibility Partial Cloud: AWS IAM instance profiles (no long-lived keys), GCP minimal service account roles, Azure securestring ARM parameters reduce supply chain risk on cloud nodes
RA-5 Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning Weekly OpenVAS network scans; monthly Nessus authenticated scans; daily PatchMon package checks; CVE correlation with NVD Implemented Cloud: Wazuh CIS SCA and vulnerability assessment on all 6 cloud nodes daily; PatchMon CVE correlation for 4 Linux cloud nodes; AWS Inspector EC2 agent-based assessment; GCP SCC vulnerability findings; Azure Defender for Cloud recommendations
RA-5(2) Update Vulnerabilities to Be Scanned Daily NVT updates (OpenVAS); plugin updates (Nessus); MISP feed sync; Shuffle CVE aggregation Implemented
RA-5(3) Breadth and Depth of Coverage Network scans (OpenVAS); authenticated OS scans (Nessus); compliance audits (CIS); 75+ assets covered Implemented Cloud: cloud nodes added to asset count; provider-native tools supplement on-premises scans
RA-5(5) Privileged Access Authenticated scans via SSH keys (Linux); domain service accounts (Windows); SNMP v3 (network devices) Implemented Cloud: Wazuh agents provide authenticated host-level visibility on all cloud nodes without network credentials
RA-5(8) Review Historic Audit Logs Vulnerability trends tracked in Grafana; historical scan results archived; MTTR calculated over time Implemented
RA-5(10) Correlate Scanning Information SIEM correlates vulnerability scans with exploit databases; Wazuh links vulnerabilities to installed software Implemented
RA-10 Threat Hunting Wazuh threat hunting queries; Splunk investigation searches; MITRE ATT&CK mapping Implemented

System and Communications Protection (SC) — 95% Compliant (24/25 Implemented)

Control Control Name Implementation Status Notes
SC-7 Boundary Protection DNS at edge (Unbound); SSH firewall rules; Traefik ingress controller; pfSense ACLs; IDS/IPS Implemented Cloud: AWS Security Groups (tailscale-access + lab-services, default-deny), GCP VPC network firewall policy homelab (17 rules, Google Threat Intelligence blocking: TOR exit nodes, malicious IPs, sanctioned countries at priority 100-130), Azure NSG homelab-nsg2 (explicit allow-list with DenyAllInBound at priority 65500). GCP Cloud Armor three-tier WAF/DDoS policies (edge, backend, application-level with SQLi/XSS blocking via v33-stable expression sets). Azure DDoS Protection plan homelab-ddos
SC-7(3) Access Points Managed access points via Traefik/Nginx Ingress; SafeLine WAF; Cloudflare/Tailscale RBAC Implemented
SC-7(4) External Telecommunications Verizon; VPN services (Tailscale, PIA); Cloudflare Tunnels Implemented
SC-7(5) Deny by Default / Allow by Exception pfSense/OPNsense default-deny rules; Traefik explicit route definitions; firewall whitelist approach Implemented Cloud: AWS Security Groups default-deny; GCP VPC firewall policy default pass with explicit deny rules for threat intelligence; Azure NSG DenyAllInBound default; Tailscale ACL default-deny
SC-7(8) Route Traffic to Authenticated Proxy Traefik reverse proxy with Authentik authentication Implemented
SC-7(21) Isolation of System Components Traefik isolates backend services; NGINX Ingress isolates K3s pods; network segmentation Implemented Cloud: per-provider VPC/VNet isolation (AWS 172.31.0.0/16, GCP 10.128.0.0/16, Azure 10.130.0.0/16); inter-cloud communication only via Tailscale overlay with ACL enforcement
SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity TLS 1.3 (Traefik); SSH encryption; DNS-over-TLS (future); encrypted scan credentials Implemented Cloud: all cloud management traffic via Tailscale WireGuard (ChaCha20-Poly1305); SSH AES-256-GCM for Linux cloud node terminal access; RDP over Tailscale tunnel for Windows nodes; cloud VPC/VNet internal traffic uses provider-encrypted private networking
SC-8(1) Cryptographic Protection AES-256-GCM (SSH/Traefik); Ed25519 keys; TLS 1.3 ciphersuites Implemented Cloud: Tailscale WireGuard (ChaCha20-Poly1305); AWS S3 SSE (SSE-S3); GCP persistent disk and GCS default encryption; Azure Managed Disk and Log Analytics workspace encrypted at rest
SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management Step-CA automated certificate issuance; SSH key generation (ed25519); centralized key management Implemented
SC-13 Cryptographic Protection Modern algorithms only (Ed25519, AES-256-GCM, TLS 1.3); weak cipher detection via vulnerability scans Implemented
SC-17 Public Key Infrastructure Certificates Step-CA PKI (Root + Intermediate CA); Traefik cert distribution; automated renewal Implemented
SC-17(1) Certificate Validation OCSP validation; CRL distribution; client certificate validation Implemented
SC-20 Secure Name/Address Resolution (Authoritative) Technitium DNS authoritative DNS; DNSSEC signing Implemented Cloud: all cloud nodes resolve via on-premises Unbound (192.168.1.153/154) over Tailscale with DNSSEC validation and malware domain blocking
SC-21 Secure Name/Address Resolution (Recursive) Unbound recursive resolver; DNSSEC validation enabled Implemented
SC-23 Session Authenticity Authentik session tokens; SSH session IDs; TLS session tickets Implemented
SC-28 Protection of Information at Rest Encrypted backups; TLS in transit; scan credential encryption; SSH private keys encrypted Implemented Cloud: AWS S3 SSE; GCP persistent disk and GCS default encryption; Azure Managed Disk and Log Analytics workspace encrypted at rest
SC-28(1) Cryptographic Protection at Rest AES-256 encrypted backups Partial
SC-28(3) Cryptographic Keys Step-CA offline root CA; SSH keys encrypted; Vaultwarden secrets management Implemented
SC-39 Process Isolation Container isolation (Docker); VM isolation (Proxmox); process separation Implemented
SC-45 System Time Synchronization NTP time synchronization across infrastructure; centralized time source Implemented Cloud: all 4 Linux cloud nodes configured with NTP (time.google.com, time.cloudflare.com) via Ansible; Windows cloud nodes sync via domain NTP policy over Tailscale
SC-45(1) Synchronization with Authoritative Time Source Chrony NTP client; Internet time servers (pool.ntp.org) Implemented

System and Information Integrity (SI) — 90% Compliant (25/28 Implemented)

Control Control Name Implementation Status Notes
SI-2 Flaw Remediation Multi-platform patch management; MTTR <72h for Critical CVEs; remediation verified via re-scans Implemented Cloud: same MTTR SLAs (Critical <72h, High <7d) applied to cloud nodes via PatchMon tracking; Ansible update_linux_hosts.yml provides emergency patching for Linux cloud nodes via Tailscale; WSUS auto-approval for critical Windows cloud node patches; cloud findings verified via follow-up Wazuh SCA scan post-remediation
SI-2(2) Automated Flaw Remediation Status Watchtower auto-updates; WSUS auto-approval rules; n8n orchestration; Wazuh alerts on unpatched systems Implemented
SI-2(4) Automated Patch Management Tools PatchMon (Linux); WSUS (Windows); Watchtower (containers); OpenVAS/Nessus verification Implemented Cloud: PatchMon on 4 Linux cloud nodes; WSUS on 2 Windows cloud nodes; Wazuh vulnerability assessment on all 6 cloud nodes
SI-2(6) Removal of Previous Versions Old container images pruned after Watchtower updates; superseded patches cleaned via WSUS Implemented
SI-3 Malicious Code Protection Wazuh FIM with VirusTotal; Suricata/Snort signatures; ClamAV/Microsoft Defender; rootkit detection Implemented Cloud: Wazuh FIM and rootkit detection on all 6 cloud nodes; Microsoft Defender active on Windows Server 2025 (AWS and Azure); ClamAV freshclam on all 4 Linux cloud nodes; AWS GuardDuty ML-based behavioral detection, GCP SCC threat detection, Azure Defender for Cloud behavioral analytics provide cloud-native malware detection layer
SI-3(4) Updates Only by Privileged Users AV signature updates restricted to admin accounts; WSUS authorization Implemented
SI-3(10) Malicious Code Analysis Cortex multi-engine analysis (VirusTotal, Yara); Shuffle malware workflow; TheHive case management Implemented
SI-4 System Monitoring Prometheus; Uptime Kuma; Splunk/Elastic SIEM; Wazuh EDR; Suricata/Snort IDS; NetAlert; multi-layered detection Implemented Cloud: AWS CloudWatch Agent (CPU, memory, disk, network per EC2 instance) and GuardDuty behavioral detection; GCP Cloud Monitoring Ops Agent and SCC threat detection and VPC network IDS endpoint; Azure Monitor VM metric alert rules (7 active: Available Memory Bytes, Data Disk IOPS, Network In/Out, OS Disk IOPS, Percentage CPU, VM Availability) and Sentinel KQL detection rules; all 6 cloud nodes enrolled in Checkmk on-premises dashboard; Uptime Kuma monitors Tailscale tunnel health
SI-4(1) System-Wide Intrusion Detection Suricata/Snort on all network segments; centralized SIEM correlation Implemented
SI-4(2) Automated Tools for Real-Time Analysis Splunk real-time correlation; Wazuh real-time FIM; Elastic SIEM; Suricata inline blocking; Cortex automation Implemented
SI-4(4) Inbound and Outbound Communications Traffic Suricata/Snort IDS on all segments; pfSense flow logs; Traefik access logs; DNS query logging; complete visibility Implemented Cloud: AWS VPC flow logs (fl-03179f74e54bf1aa4, CloudWatch Logs); GCP VPC flow logs (default network, Flow Analyzer); Azure NSG flow logs (Network Watcher homelab-nsg2); Tailscale tunnel telemetry for all cloud-to-on-premises management paths
SI-4(5) System-Generated Alerts Discord webhooks; Splunk scheduled alerts; Wazuh Discord/email; Prometheus Alertmanager; CVSS-based routing Implemented
SI-4(12) Automated Alerts Prometheus Alertmanager; Grafana automated alerts; Splunk real-time searches; Wazuh Active Response triggers Implemented
SI-4(16) Correlate Monitoring Information Multi-source correlation across Splunk/Elastic/Wazuh/network logs; TheHive aggregation Implemented Cloud: cloud node Wazuh agent telemetry included in on-premises Splunk SPL correlation searches; GuardDuty and Sentinel findings auto-create TheHive cases via Shuffle SOAR for unified case management
SI-4(18) Analyze Traffic/Event Patterns Cortex pattern recognition; MISP campaign correlation Partial
SI-4(23) Host-Based Devices Wazuh EDR on 25+ on-premises endpoints; FIM real-time monitoring; rootkit detection; process monitoring; Sysmon integration Implemented Cloud: Wazuh EDR deployed on all 6 cloud nodes with same FIM, rootkit detection, process monitoring, and CIS SCA configuration as on-premises (31+ total agents)
SI-5 Security Alerts, Advisories, and Directives PatchMon CVE alerts; WUD update notifications; Discord webhooks; OpenVAS/Nessus scan completion alerts Implemented
SI-5(1) Automated Alerts and Advisories Discord webhooks for scan completion; CVSS-based alert routing; TheHive case auto-creation Implemented
SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity Docker image SHA-256 verification; Step-CA certificate validation; Wazuh FIM integrity monitoring Implemented
SI-7(1) Integrity Checks Wazuh FIM real-time integrity monitoring; file hash verification; registry monitoring (Windows) Implemented Cloud: Wazuh FIM on all 6 cloud nodes monitors same critical paths as on-premises (Linux: /etc, /bin, /sbin; Windows: System32, registry keys)
SI-7(6) Cryptographic Protection SHA-256 image signatures; TLS certificate validation; file integrity checksums Implemented
SI-7(7) Integration of Detection and Response Wazuh FIM triggers Active Response; SIEM correlation with integrity violations Implemented Cloud: Wazuh Active Response on cloud nodes triggers firewall-drop, host-deny, account-disable in response to integrity violations
SI-10 Information Input Validation WAF input validation (SafeLine); Traefik header validation; DNS query sanitization Implemented
SI-12 Information Management and Retention 90-day log retention; 30-day backup retention; automated lifecycle management Implemented Cloud: cloud audit log retention policy (AWS S3 90-day lifecycle; GCP 400-day Admin Activity; Azure Log Analytics 90-day) consistent with on-premises SIEM policy

Supply Chain Risk Management (SR) — 40% Compliant

Control Control Name Implementation Status Notes
SR-3 Supply Chain Controls and Processes Vetted open-source projects; trusted Docker registries; official package repositories Partial Cloud: AWS IAM instance profiles (least-privilege, no long-lived access keys on EC2); GCP service accounts (minimal roles, no owner/editor on Compute instances); Azure VMs provisioned via ARM template with securestring parameters; all 6 cloud nodes enrolled in same vetted open-source management stack (Wazuh, Ansible, Checkmk, PatchMon) as on-premises hosts
SR-10 Inspection of Systems or Components Visual inspection of hardware; no formal process Partial
SR-11 Component Authenticity Docker image signature verification; package signature validation Implemented Cloud: cloud provider base images (AMIs, GCP Compute images, Azure Marketplace images) tracked by version; provider-maintained images used with same-day security patch availability
SR-12 Component Disposal Secure deletion procedures; encrypted storage wiping Implemented Cloud: AWS EC2 EBS volume deletion on instance termination; GCP persistent disk deletion; Azure Managed Disk cleanup — all documented in decommissioning runbook

Version History

Version Date Changes
1.0 January 2026 Initial release
2.0 April 2026 Cloud IaaS integration (AWS, Azure, GCP — 6 nodes). Cloud content integrated into Notes column of all relevant controls. Change log added