NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Framework¶
Document Control:
Version: 2.0
Last Updated: April 2026
Owner: Paul Leone
Framework Version: NIST SP 800-53 Revision 5
Overview¶
324+ individual requirements across 18 control families. Strong compliance in technical families (AC, AU, IA, SC, SI) at 85%+ implementation. Version 2.0 integrates cloud workload coverage across AWS, GCP, and Azure — 6 nodes total connected via Tailscale WireGuard mesh VPN. Cloud-native security services (GuardDuty, Security Command Center, Defender for Cloud/Sentinel) augment on-premises controls across all relevant families.
Overall Maturity: High (Technical Controls) / Moderate (Administrative Controls)
| Tier | Families | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Tier 4 (Adaptive) | AU, IA, SI, CM | Automated correlation, PKI automation, multi-layered detection including NSM and cloud-native tools, IaC drift detection |
| Tier 3 (Defined) | AC, IR, RA, SC | Documented policies, centralized enforcement, behavioral monitoring, cloud boundary protection |
| Tier 2 (Managed) | CP, CA, MA | Scheduled scanning, restore testing, change control |
| N/A | PE, PS, PM, PL, MP | Constrained by single-user homelab context |
Access Control (AC) — 90% Compliant (27/30 Implemented)¶
| Control | Control Name | Implementation | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AC-1 | Policy and Procedures | Lab mission statement defines security-first architecture; documented access control requirements | Implemented | |
| AC-2 | Account Management | Authentik user lifecycle management; SSH individual user accounts; Wazuh tracks active sessions; no shared credentials | Implemented | Cloud: Linux cloud node accounts managed via Ansible SSH key distribution; Windows cloud nodes managed via Active Directory (domain-joined over Tailscale); cloud IAM service accounts inventoried with minimal role assignments |
| AC-2(1) | Automated System Account Management | Authentik automated provisioning/deprovisioning | Implemented | |
| AC-2(3) | Disable Accounts | Authentik automated account disabling after 90 days inactivity | Partial | Cloud: AWS IAM access keys reviewed quarterly (no long-lived keys on EC2 — instance profiles used); GCP IAM recommender audits service accounts; Azure Entra ID accounts subject to 45-day dormancy policy |
| AC-2(4) | Automated Audit Actions | SIEM tracks all account creation/modification/deletion | Implemented | Cloud: CloudTrail, GCP Admin Activity, Azure Activity Log capture all cloud IAM events |
| AC-2(5) | Inactivity Logout | Authentik 30-min idle timeout; SSH ClientAliveInterval=300 | Implemented | |
| AC-2(7) | Privileged User Accounts | Separate admin accounts; monitored via SIEM; MFA enforced | Implemented | Cloud: AWS IAM instance profiles scoped to minimum required actions; GCP service accounts use minimal roles; Azure subscription admin access MFA-enforced via Entra Conditional Access |
| AC-2(12) | Account Monitoring Atypical Usage | Splunk behavioral analysis; unusual login times/geoIP tracking | Partial | Cloud: Azure Sentinel KQL rule detects sign-in from new geographic location; GuardDuty CredentialAccess findings; GCP SCC IAM anomaly detection |
| AC-2(13) | Disable High-Risk Accounts | Wazuh Active Response disables compromised accounts | Implemented | Cloud: Wazuh Active Response (disable-account) executes on cloud nodes via Tailscale using same playbooks as on-premises |
| AC-3 | Access Enforcement | Authentik/AD RBAC groups; SSH sudo enforcement; Traefik middleware access control | Implemented | Cloud: Tailscale ACL policy enforces per-device/per-subnet explicit allow rules (default deny for all inter-node traffic) |
| AC-3(7) | Role-Based Access Control | Authentik groups map to application permissions; AD OUs for Windows | Implemented | |
| AC-3(8) | Revocation of Access | Centralized SSH key revocation via Ansible; Authentik account deactivation | Implemented | Cloud: Tailscale node key revocation; AWS IAM role disassociation; GCP service account removal; Azure Entra ID account deactivation — all documented in decommissioning runbook |
| AC-6 | Least Privilege | SSH sudo policies; Authentik role-based permissions; minimal access granted | Implemented | Cloud: AWS IAM instance profiles (no wildcard actions); GCP minimal role assignments (no owner/editor on Compute); Azure RBAC scoped per resource group |
| AC-6(1) | Authorize Access to Security Functions | Security tool access restricted to SOC role; documented in Authentik | Implemented | |
| AC-6(2) | Non-Privileged Access for Non-Security Functions | Standard user accounts for daily operations | Implemented | |
| AC-6(5) | Privileged Accounts | Separate privileged accounts; monitored; MFA enforced | Implemented | |
| AC-6(9) | Log Use of Privileged Functions | All sudo commands logged to SIEM; Windows privileged operations audited | Implemented | Cloud: cloud console admin actions logged via CloudTrail, GCP Audit Logs, Azure Activity Log |
| AC-7 | Unsuccessful Logon Attempts | SSH MaxAuthTries=5; Authentik lockout after 5 failures; Wazuh active-response | Implemented | |
| AC-8 | System Use Notification | SSH banner configured; Authentik login notice | Implemented | |
| AC-12 | Session Termination | Authentik session timeout; SSH automatic disconnect | Implemented | |
| AC-17 | Remote Access | SSH hardening; IP restrictions (firewall + Traefik); MFA for admin access; Tailscale VPN | Implemented | Cloud: SSH (Linux) and RDP (Windows) restricted to homelab subnets (192.168.0.0/16) via AWS Security Groups, GCP VPC firewall policy, Azure NSG; all management traffic routed through Tailscale WireGuard with no public internet exposure |
| AC-17(1) | Monitoring and Control | VPN connections logged; SSH sessions monitored; Traefik access logs | Implemented | Cloud: Tailscale tunnel telemetry; cloud provider flow logs (VPC flow logs, NSG flow logs) supplement on-premises monitoring |
| AC-17(2) | Protection via Encryption | SSH AES-256-GCM; TLS 1.3 (Traefik); Tailscale WireGuard | Implemented | Cloud: all cloud management traffic via Tailscale WireGuard (ChaCha20-Poly1305); no plaintext management paths |
| AC-17(4) | Privileged Commands via Remote Access | Privileged SSH sessions logged separately; sudo usage tracked | Implemented | |
| AC-17(9) | Disconnect or Disable Access | Remote access can be disabled via firewall rules; Tailscale ACLs | Partial | Cloud: Tailscale node key revocation immediately removes cloud node access; provider-native Security Group/NSG modification available for emergency lockout |
| AC-17(10) | Authenticate Remote Commands | SSH key-based authentication; command verification via logging | Implemented |
Audit and Accountability (AU) — 100% Compliant (18/18 Implemented)¶
| Control | Control Name | Implementation | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AU-1 | Policy and Procedures | Comprehensive logging policy documented; 100% security event coverage requirement | Implemented | Cloud: cloud audit logging policy extended to AWS CloudTrail, GCP Admin Activity, Azure Activity Log with 90-day retention requirement matched across all providers |
| AU-2 | Event Logging | DNS queries, SSH sessions, Traefik requests, patch events, scan activity, Wazuh events logged | Implemented | Cloud: AWS CloudTrail (all management events to S3 with SSE); GCP Admin Activity logs (always-on) and Data Access audit logs; Azure Activity Log and Monitor; Wazuh agents on all 6 cloud nodes forward endpoint security events to on-premises Splunk |
| AU-3 | Content of Audit Records | Logs include: timestamp, user, source IP, action, result; Wazuh includes file hashes, process trees | Implemented | Cloud: CloudTrail includes IAM identity, source IP, user agent, request/response detail; GCP audit logs include principal identity, resource, method, source IP; Azure Activity Log includes caller identity, resource, operation |
| AU-3(1) | Additional Audit Information | SSH key fingerprints, DNS query details, Traefik request/response, Sysmon process telemetry | Implemented | |
| AU-4 | Audit Log Storage Capacity | 90-day retention; auto-archival to cold storage; capacity monitoring via Prometheus | Implemented | Cloud: AWS S3 lifecycle policy (90-day); GCP Cloud Logging retention per GCP defaults (400 days for admin activity); Azure Log Analytics homelab-log retention set to 90 days |
| AU-5 | Response to Audit Logging Process Failures | SIEM alerts on logging failures; redundant log paths (local + remote) | Implemented | Cloud: Azure Sentinel AMA data gap detection rule alerts when cloud agent heartbeat absent for 15+ minutes |
| AU-5(1) | Storage Capacity Warning | Prometheus/Pulse alerts at 80% capacity; automated archival triggers | Implemented | |
| AU-5(2) | Real-Time Alerts | Splunk/Elastic real-time correlation; Wazuh instant alerts; sub-60s notification latency | Implemented | |
| AU-6 | Audit Record Review | Splunk/Elastic dashboards (DNS/SSH/Traefik); automated correlation; vulnerability trending | Implemented | Cloud: CloudWatch Alarms (AWS), GCP Cloud Monitoring alerting policies, Azure Monitor alert rules (7 active VM metric alerts); all feed Discord/email notification channels |
| AU-6(1) | Automated Process Integration | SIEM correlation across Splunk/Elastic/Wazuh; TheHive case aggregation; n8n/Shuffle workflows | Implemented | |
| AU-6(3) | Correlate Audit Record Repositories | Multi-source correlation: Splunk + Elastic + Wazuh + network logs; unified timeline analysis | Implemented | Cloud: Wazuh agents on all 6 cloud nodes forward endpoint events to on-premises Splunk for unified cross-environment correlation |
| AU-6(5) | Integrated Analysis | Cortex multi-engine analysis; MISP threat intelligence; Shuffle enrichment pipelines | Implemented | |
| AU-7 | Audit Record Reduction | Splunk SPL queries; Elastic KQL; Wazuh filters; automated report generation | Implemented | |
| AU-7(1) | Automatic Processing | Scheduled Splunk searches; Elastic detection rules; automated dashboards | Implemented | |
| AU-9 | Protection of Audit Information | Logs forwarded to immutable SIEM; Splunk read-only indexes; syslog-ng TLS encryption; Elastic immutable streams | Implemented | Cloud: AWS S3 CloudTrail bucket with SSE; GCP Admin Activity logs (cannot be disabled); Azure Log Analytics immutable data retention |
| AU-11 | Audit Record Retention | 90-day hot retention; 1-year cold storage; automated lifecycle management | Implemented | Cloud: all cloud audit sources maintain 90-day minimum retention matching on-premises SIEM policy |
| AU-12 | Audit Record Generation | Universal Forwarders (30+ hosts); Elastic Agents; Wazuh agents (31+ including 6 cloud); structured JSON format | Implemented | Cloud: Wazuh agents on all 6 cloud nodes; AWS CloudTrail; GCP Audit Logs; Azure Monitor all feed on-premises Splunk indexer |
| AU-12(1) | System-Wide Audit Trail | Centralized logging across all infrastructure; time-correlated via NTP (SC-45) | Implemented | Cloud: cloud nodes NTP-synced (time.google.com, time.cloudflare.com via Ansible) ensuring consistent timestamps across on-premises and cloud audit trails |
| AU-12(2) | Standardized Formats | JSON/CEF formats; normalized in SIEM; CIM-compliant (Splunk) | Implemented |
Assessment, Authorization, and Monitoring (CA) — 80% Compliant (8/10 Implemented)¶
| Control | Control Name | Implementation | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CA-1 | Policy and Procedures | Assessment and authorization policy documented; continuous monitoring strategy defined | Implemented | |
| CA-2 | Control Assessments | Weekly OpenVAS scans; monthly Nessus authenticated scans; CIS Benchmark audits; Wazuh SCA | Implemented | Cloud: Wazuh CIS SCA on all 6 cloud nodes daily; AWS Inspector, GCP SCC vulnerability assessment, Azure Defender for Cloud recommendations provide supplemental cloud-native assessment |
| CA-2(1) | Independent Assessors | N/A — Single user homelab | N/A | |
| CA-3 | Information Exchange | Documented interconnections; firewall rules for external connections | Partial | Cloud: Tailscale mesh topology documented; VPC/VNet CIDR allocations and subnet router configurations documented |
| CA-5 | Plan of Action and Milestones | Vulnerability tracking in TheHive; remediation SLAs documented | Partial | Cloud: cloud node findings tracked in same TheHive instance as on-premises; Critical <72h, High <7d MTTR SLAs apply to cloud scope |
| CA-6 | Authorization | N/A — Single user homelab | N/A | |
| CA-7 | Continuous Monitoring | Automated vulnerability scanning; real-time patch status; security posture dashboards; Wazuh real-time FIM | Implemented | Cloud: AWS GuardDuty (VPC flow, CloudTrail, DNS — real-time ML detection), GCP SCC (asset inventory, vulnerability assessment, network IDS endpoint), Azure Defender for Cloud (CSPM Secure Score) and Sentinel (KQL detection rules, automated response); all integrated with on-premises SIEM via Wazuh agent telemetry |
| CA-7(3) | Trend Analyses | Grafana dashboards track vulnerability trends over time | Implemented | Cloud: PatchMon cloud patch compliance trending; AWS Security Hub score trending; GCP SCC findings trend; Azure Defender for Cloud Secure Score monitored |
| CA-8 | Penetration Testing | Informal testing — scanning, enumeration, vulnerability assessments | Partial | |
| CA-9 | Internal System Connections | Network diagram documents internal connections; firewall rules enforce segmentation; NetAlert mapping | Implemented | Cloud: Tailscale mesh routing tables, VPC/VNet topology, and cloud-to-on-premises routing documented |
Configuration Management (CM) — 95% Compliant (15/16 Implemented)¶
| Control | Control Name | Implementation | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CM-1 | Policy and Procedures | Configuration management policy documented; IaC standards defined | Implemented | |
| CM-2 | Baseline Configuration | Ansible playbooks define baselines; PatchMon baseline tracking; CIS Benchmark baselines audited via Nessus | Implemented | Cloud: Ansible linux_hardening.yml and new_install_baseline_roles.yml applied to all 4 Linux cloud nodes; Windows cloud nodes managed via GPO (domain-joined); Azure ARM template version-controlled in Git |
| CM-2(2) | Automation Support | Ansible automation; Terraform IaC; automated baseline verification | Implemented | Cloud: Terraform manages AWS Security Groups, GCP VPC firewall policy, Azure NSG rules as IaC; Git commit required for all cloud network changes |
| CM-2(3) | Retention of Previous Configurations | Git version control; snapshot-before-patch; configuration history retained | Implemented | Cloud: cloud infrastructure change history in CloudTrail, GCP Audit Logs, Azure Activity Log; Terraform state versioned |
| CM-3 | Configuration Change Control | Snapshot-before-patch; WSUS approval workflows; pre-scan snapshots; Git pull requests | Implemented | Cloud: Terraform plan review required before cloud infrastructure changes; ARM template parameter validation before Azure deployment; no ad-hoc console changes |
| CM-3(2) | Testing and Validation | WSUS test deployments; Ansible dry-run; patch validation before production | Implemented | Cloud: Wazuh SCA post-rebuild validates CIS baseline compliance for cloud nodes; cloud node rebuild timing validated against RTO target |
| CM-5 | Access Restrictions for Change | Ansible playbook execution restricted; WSUS approval required; Git branch protection | Implemented | |
| CM-6 | Configuration Settings | CIS Benchmark compliance audits; hardened SSH/Traefik configs; configuration deviations detected | Implemented | Cloud: Wazuh SCA applies CIS benchmarks (CIS Amazon Linux, Debian 12/13, Ubuntu 22.04/24.04, Windows Server 2025) to all 6 cloud nodes daily |
| CM-6(1) | Automated Management | Ansible automation; configuration drift detection; automated remediation | Implemented | Cloud: Ansible drift detection runs against cloud nodes via Tailscale SSH; non-compliant findings trigger Discord alerts |
| CM-7 | Least Functionality | Unnecessary services disabled; verified via authenticated Nessus scans | Implemented | Cloud: cloud nodes provisioned with minimal base images; Wazuh SCA validates running services against CIS benchmarks on all 6 cloud nodes |
| CM-8 | System Component Inventory | PatchMon (5,000+ packages, 30+ hosts); WUD (50+ containers); OpenVAS/Nessus asset databases; Wazuh agent inventory (31+); NetAlert Inventory | Implemented | Cloud: 6 cloud nodes across AWS, GCP, Azure tracked in PatchMon, Wazuh (31+ agents), Checkmk, and Tailscale admin console (tailf07c05.ts.net). Per-provider instance IDs documented |
| CM-8(1) | Updates During Install/Removal | Inventory updated automatically and manually; Wazuh tracks software changes | Implemented | |
| CM-8(2) | Automated Maintenance | PatchMon daily updates; WUD container tracking; automated inventory reconciliation | Implemented | |
| CM-8(3) | Automated Unauthorized Component Detection | Nessus compliance scans detect unauthorized software; Wazuh FIM alerts on new executables; NetAlert new device notifications | Implemented | |
| CM-9 | Configuration Management Plan | IaC strategy documented; Ansible playbook standards; Git workflow defined | Partial | |
| CM-14 | Signed Components | Docker image signature verification (SHA-256); Step-CA signed certificates | Implemented |
Contingency Planning (CP) — 75% Compliant (6/8 Implemented)¶
| Control | Control Name | Implementation | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CP-1 | Policy and Procedures | Backup procedures documented; failover strategies defined | Partial | |
| CP-9 | System Backup | Proxmox automated backups bi-weekly; encrypted backups; dual backup solutions | Implemented | Cloud: AWS EBS snapshots (encrypted); GCP disk snapshots (encrypted at rest); Azure VM snapshots (encrypted); cloud node rebuild from Git + Ansible provides IaC recovery path. Cloud node RTO <2hr validated |
| CP-9(1) | Testing for Reliability | Quarterly restore testing documented | Implemented | Cloud: Azure Spot instance eviction/restart scenario tested; cloud node Ansible rebuild timing validated |
| CP-9(3) | Separate Storage | Off-host encrypted backups; physically separate storage | Implemented | |
| CP-9(8) | Cryptographic Protection | Encrypted backups via Proxmox Backup Server | Implemented | Cloud: AWS S3 SSE; GCP persistent disk default encryption; Azure Managed Disk encryption |
| CP-10 | System Recovery | Documented restore procedures; IaC enables rapid rebuild | Partial | Cloud: cloud node rebuild runbooks (Tailscale enrollment, Wazuh agent reinstallation, Ansible baseline) documented and tested |
Identification and Authentication (IA) — 95% Compliant (17/18 Implemented)¶
| Control | Control Name | Implementation | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IA-1 | Policy and Procedures | Authentication policy documented; MFA requirements defined | Implemented | |
| IA-2 | Identification and Authentication | SSH keys; Authentik SSO; unique user identities required | Implemented | Cloud: Linux cloud nodes use SSH Ed25519 key-based authentication (passwords disabled globally via Ansible). Windows cloud nodes (AWS Windows Server 2025, Azure Windows Server 2025) domain-joined to home.com via Tailscale — Kerberos authentication, Group Policy, and WSUS extended to cloud |
| IA-2(1) | MFA to Privileged Accounts | Authentik TOTP enforced for all admin accounts; SSH key + passphrase | Implemented | Cloud: AWS console MFA enforced via IAM policy; GCP console requires Google MFA; Azure admin access enforced via Entra Conditional Access |
| IA-2(2) | MFA to Non-Privileged Accounts | Authentik TOTP available; SSH keys only (equivalent to 2FA) | Implemented | |
| IA-2(8) | Replay Resistant | SSH session tokens; Authentik session cookies with CSRF protection | Implemented | |
| IA-2(10) | Single Sign-On | Authentik SSO integration; Traefik ForwardAuth; OAuth2 provider | Implemented | |
| IA-3 | Device Identification | SSH host keys; device certificates via Step-CA | Implemented | Cloud: all 6 cloud nodes enrolled in Tailscale tailnet (tailf07c05.ts.net) with device-bound WireGuard keys serving as cryptographic device identifiers; Wazuh agent IDs provide device identity in SIEM |
| IA-4 | Identifier Management | Centralized user management via Authentik/AD; SSH keys tracked in Ansible | Implemented | Cloud: AWS IAM instance profiles, GCP service accounts, Azure Managed Identity inventoried; cloud node local user accounts tracked via Wazuh agent inventory |
| IA-5 | Authenticator Management | SSH keys managed via Ansible; Authentik credential policies; centralized key distribution | Implemented | Cloud: SSH key distribution to cloud nodes via Ansible new_install_baseline_roles.yml; quarterly key rotation playbook |
| IA-5(1) | Password-Based Authentication | SSH passwords disabled globally; Authentik enforces complexity requirements | Implemented | |
| IA-5(2) | PKI-Based Authentication | Step-CA two-tier PKI; SSH Ed25519 keys; automated certificate issuance | Implemented | |
| IA-5(7) | No Embedded Unencrypted Authenticators | Vaultwarden secrets management; Ansible Vault encrypted vars; no hardcoded credentials | Implemented | Cloud: no credentials embedded in cloud node configurations; Ansible Vault protects all cloud node credentials; cloud IAM uses instance profiles/service accounts (no hardcoded keys) |
| IA-5(14) | Managing PKI Trust Stores | Step-CA root/intermediate CA management; automated trust distribution | Implemented | |
| IA-5(18) | Password Managers | Vaultwarden deployed; biometric unlock; zero-knowledge encryption | Implemented | |
| IA-11 | Re-authentication | Authentik session timeout requires re-auth; SSH session timeout | Implemented |
Incident Response (IR) — 90% Compliant (11/13 Implemented)¶
| Control | Control Name | Implementation | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IR-1 | Policy and Procedures | Incident response policy documented; SOC procedures defined | Implemented | |
| IR-4 | Incident Handling | TheHive case management; Wazuh Active Response; Splunk correlation; n8n/Shuffle SOAR orchestration | Implemented | Cloud: Wazuh Active Response (firewall-drop, host-deny, account-disable) executes on cloud nodes via Tailscale. AWS GuardDuty and Azure Sentinel incidents auto-create TheHive cases via Shuffle SOAR webhook. GCP SCC findings trigger alerting policy notifications |
| IR-4(1) | Automated Incident Handling | Wazuh Active Response (firewall-drop, host-deny); VirusTotal quarantine; Shuffle workflows; sub-30-min MTTR | Implemented | |
| IR-4(4) | Information Correlation | TheHive correlates Splunk/Wazuh/Suricata/scanners; Cortex enrichment; MISP threat context | Implemented | Cloud: cloud node Wazuh agent telemetry included in TheHive case correlation; GuardDuty finding types mapped to MITRE ATT&CK in Shuffle SOAR workflow |
| IR-5 | Incident Monitoring | Real-time SIEM dashboards; Discord notifications; TheHive case tracking; 100% security event visibility | Implemented | |
| IR-5(1) | Automated Tracking | TheHive automated case creation; Shuffle orchestration; Cortex job tracking; Wazuh forensic data collection | Implemented | |
| IR-6 | Incident Reporting | TheHive case documentation; Shuffle notifications; Discord/email alerting; Splunk executive reports | Implemented | |
| IR-6(1) | Automated Reporting | Shuffle automated notifications (Discord, email, PagerDuty); TheHive status updates; Splunk scheduled reports | Implemented | |
| IR-7 | Incident Response Assistance | TheHive knowledge base; documented playbooks (15+); Shuffle workflow library; Cortex analyzer catalog | Implemented | Cloud: cloud node IR runbooks (Tailscale containment, Security Group/NSG modification, Wazuh Active Response) documented |
| IR-8 | Incident Response Plan | Comprehensive IR plan; TheHive playbooks; Shuffle workflows; multi-channel alerting | Implemented | |
| IR-8(1) | Breaches | Limited — Wazuh automated alerting and active response; TheHive automated case creation | Partial |
Maintenance (MA) — 60% Compliant (4/6 Implemented)¶
| Control | Control Name | Implementation | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MA-1 | Policy and Procedures | Maintenance policy informal — personal lab environment | Partial | |
| MA-2 | Controlled Maintenance | Change control via Git; snapshot-before-patch | Partial | |
| MA-3 | Maintenance Tools | Ansible automation tools version controlled | Partial | |
| MA-4 | Nonlocal Maintenance | SSH remote maintenance logged; session monitoring | Implemented | Cloud: all cloud node maintenance via SSH over Tailscale with session logging; Windows cloud node maintenance via RDP over Tailscale; all maintenance actions logged via CloudTrail/GCP Audit Logs/Azure Activity Log |
| MA-4(6) | Cryptographic Protection | SSH encryption for remote maintenance; TLS for web-based tools | Implemented | Cloud: all cloud maintenance traffic encrypted via Tailscale WireGuard (ChaCha20-Poly1305) |
| MA-6 | Timely Maintenance | Patch SLAs defined and tracked | Partial | Cloud: same Critical <72h, High <7d MTTR SLAs applied to cloud nodes; PatchMon dashboard tracks cloud patch compliance |
Media Protection (MP) — 40% Compliant¶
| Control | Control Name | Implementation | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MP-4 | Media Storage | Backup media stored securely; encrypted | Implemented | |
| MP-7 | Media Use | Removable media disabled via GPO (Windows) | Partial |
Physical and Environmental Protection (PE) — N/A (Residential Homelab)¶
| Control | Control Name | Implementation | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PE-9 | Power Equipment and Cabling | UPS battery backup for critical systems | N/A | Cloud: physical infrastructure managed by cloud provider (AWS, GCP, Azure maintain SOC 2 certified data centers) |
| PE-11 | Emergency Power | UPS provides temporary power | N/A |
Planning (PL) — 60% Compliant¶
| Control | Control Name | Implementation | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PL-2 | System Security Plans | GRC documentation serves as security plan | Implemented | |
| PL-8 | Security Architecture | Defense-in-depth architecture documented; network diagrams maintained | Implemented | Cloud: multi-cloud hybrid architecture documented in GRC documents; Tailscale mesh topology, VPC/VNet diagrams, and routing tables maintained |
| PL-8(1) | Defense in Depth | Multi-layer security controls across network/application/data layers | Implemented |
Program Management (PM) — 40% Compliant¶
| Control | Control Name | Implementation | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PM-5 | System Inventory | Comprehensive asset inventory maintained (PatchMon, Wazuh, OpenVAS, Nessus, NetAlert) | Implemented | Cloud: 6 cloud nodes tracked in PatchMon, Wazuh (31+ agents), Checkmk, and Tailscale admin console |
| PM-9 | Risk Management Strategy | Risk-based vulnerability prioritization; CVSS scoring | Implemented | |
| PM-16(1) | Automated Threat Intelligence Sharing | MISP automated feed synchronization; Shuffle vulnerability aggregation | Implemented | Cloud: AWS GuardDuty, GCP SCC, Azure Sentinel findings available to MISP for IOC correlation |
Risk Assessment (RA) — 85% Compliant (10/12 Implemented)¶
| Control | Control Name | Implementation | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RA-1 | Policy and Procedures | Risk assessment policy documented; CVSS scoring methodology defined | Implemented | |
| RA-3 | Risk Assessment | CVSS scoring of vulnerabilities; exploit likelihood assessment; risk-based remediation prioritization | Implemented | Cloud: same CVSS-based risk assessment applied to cloud node findings from PatchMon, AWS Inspector, GCP SCC, Azure Defender for Cloud |
| RA-3(1) | Supply Chain Risk Assessment | MISP vendor compromise tracking; limited supply chain visibility | Partial | Cloud: AWS IAM instance profiles (no long-lived keys), GCP minimal service account roles, Azure securestring ARM parameters reduce supply chain risk on cloud nodes |
| RA-5 | Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning | Weekly OpenVAS network scans; monthly Nessus authenticated scans; daily PatchMon package checks; CVE correlation with NVD | Implemented | Cloud: Wazuh CIS SCA and vulnerability assessment on all 6 cloud nodes daily; PatchMon CVE correlation for 4 Linux cloud nodes; AWS Inspector EC2 agent-based assessment; GCP SCC vulnerability findings; Azure Defender for Cloud recommendations |
| RA-5(2) | Update Vulnerabilities to Be Scanned | Daily NVT updates (OpenVAS); plugin updates (Nessus); MISP feed sync; Shuffle CVE aggregation | Implemented | |
| RA-5(3) | Breadth and Depth of Coverage | Network scans (OpenVAS); authenticated OS scans (Nessus); compliance audits (CIS); 75+ assets covered | Implemented | Cloud: cloud nodes added to asset count; provider-native tools supplement on-premises scans |
| RA-5(5) | Privileged Access | Authenticated scans via SSH keys (Linux); domain service accounts (Windows); SNMP v3 (network devices) | Implemented | Cloud: Wazuh agents provide authenticated host-level visibility on all cloud nodes without network credentials |
| RA-5(8) | Review Historic Audit Logs | Vulnerability trends tracked in Grafana; historical scan results archived; MTTR calculated over time | Implemented | |
| RA-5(10) | Correlate Scanning Information | SIEM correlates vulnerability scans with exploit databases; Wazuh links vulnerabilities to installed software | Implemented | |
| RA-10 | Threat Hunting | Wazuh threat hunting queries; Splunk investigation searches; MITRE ATT&CK mapping | Implemented |
System and Communications Protection (SC) — 95% Compliant (24/25 Implemented)¶
| Control | Control Name | Implementation | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SC-7 | Boundary Protection | DNS at edge (Unbound); SSH firewall rules; Traefik ingress controller; pfSense ACLs; IDS/IPS | Implemented | Cloud: AWS Security Groups (tailscale-access + lab-services, default-deny), GCP VPC network firewall policy homelab (17 rules, Google Threat Intelligence blocking: TOR exit nodes, malicious IPs, sanctioned countries at priority 100-130), Azure NSG homelab-nsg2 (explicit allow-list with DenyAllInBound at priority 65500). GCP Cloud Armor three-tier WAF/DDoS policies (edge, backend, application-level with SQLi/XSS blocking via v33-stable expression sets). Azure DDoS Protection plan homelab-ddos |
| SC-7(3) | Access Points | Managed access points via Traefik/Nginx Ingress; SafeLine WAF; Cloudflare/Tailscale RBAC | Implemented | |
| SC-7(4) | External Telecommunications | Verizon; VPN services (Tailscale, PIA); Cloudflare Tunnels | Implemented | |
| SC-7(5) | Deny by Default / Allow by Exception | pfSense/OPNsense default-deny rules; Traefik explicit route definitions; firewall whitelist approach | Implemented | Cloud: AWS Security Groups default-deny; GCP VPC firewall policy default pass with explicit deny rules for threat intelligence; Azure NSG DenyAllInBound default; Tailscale ACL default-deny |
| SC-7(8) | Route Traffic to Authenticated Proxy | Traefik reverse proxy with Authentik authentication | Implemented | |
| SC-7(21) | Isolation of System Components | Traefik isolates backend services; NGINX Ingress isolates K3s pods; network segmentation | Implemented | Cloud: per-provider VPC/VNet isolation (AWS 172.31.0.0/16, GCP 10.128.0.0/16, Azure 10.130.0.0/16); inter-cloud communication only via Tailscale overlay with ACL enforcement |
| SC-8 | Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity | TLS 1.3 (Traefik); SSH encryption; DNS-over-TLS (future); encrypted scan credentials | Implemented | Cloud: all cloud management traffic via Tailscale WireGuard (ChaCha20-Poly1305); SSH AES-256-GCM for Linux cloud node terminal access; RDP over Tailscale tunnel for Windows nodes; cloud VPC/VNet internal traffic uses provider-encrypted private networking |
| SC-8(1) | Cryptographic Protection | AES-256-GCM (SSH/Traefik); Ed25519 keys; TLS 1.3 ciphersuites | Implemented | Cloud: Tailscale WireGuard (ChaCha20-Poly1305); AWS S3 SSE (SSE-S3); GCP persistent disk and GCS default encryption; Azure Managed Disk and Log Analytics workspace encrypted at rest |
| SC-12 | Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management | Step-CA automated certificate issuance; SSH key generation (ed25519); centralized key management | Implemented | |
| SC-13 | Cryptographic Protection | Modern algorithms only (Ed25519, AES-256-GCM, TLS 1.3); weak cipher detection via vulnerability scans | Implemented | |
| SC-17 | Public Key Infrastructure Certificates | Step-CA PKI (Root + Intermediate CA); Traefik cert distribution; automated renewal | Implemented | |
| SC-17(1) | Certificate Validation | OCSP validation; CRL distribution; client certificate validation | Implemented | |
| SC-20 | Secure Name/Address Resolution (Authoritative) | Technitium DNS authoritative DNS; DNSSEC signing | Implemented | Cloud: all cloud nodes resolve via on-premises Unbound (192.168.1.153/154) over Tailscale with DNSSEC validation and malware domain blocking |
| SC-21 | Secure Name/Address Resolution (Recursive) | Unbound recursive resolver; DNSSEC validation enabled | Implemented | |
| SC-23 | Session Authenticity | Authentik session tokens; SSH session IDs; TLS session tickets | Implemented | |
| SC-28 | Protection of Information at Rest | Encrypted backups; TLS in transit; scan credential encryption; SSH private keys encrypted | Implemented | Cloud: AWS S3 SSE; GCP persistent disk and GCS default encryption; Azure Managed Disk and Log Analytics workspace encrypted at rest |
| SC-28(1) | Cryptographic Protection at Rest | AES-256 encrypted backups | Partial | |
| SC-28(3) | Cryptographic Keys | Step-CA offline root CA; SSH keys encrypted; Vaultwarden secrets management | Implemented | |
| SC-39 | Process Isolation | Container isolation (Docker); VM isolation (Proxmox); process separation | Implemented | |
| SC-45 | System Time Synchronization | NTP time synchronization across infrastructure; centralized time source | Implemented | Cloud: all 4 Linux cloud nodes configured with NTP (time.google.com, time.cloudflare.com) via Ansible; Windows cloud nodes sync via domain NTP policy over Tailscale |
| SC-45(1) | Synchronization with Authoritative Time Source | Chrony NTP client; Internet time servers (pool.ntp.org) | Implemented |
System and Information Integrity (SI) — 90% Compliant (25/28 Implemented)¶
| Control | Control Name | Implementation | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SI-2 | Flaw Remediation | Multi-platform patch management; MTTR <72h for Critical CVEs; remediation verified via re-scans | Implemented | Cloud: same MTTR SLAs (Critical <72h, High <7d) applied to cloud nodes via PatchMon tracking; Ansible update_linux_hosts.yml provides emergency patching for Linux cloud nodes via Tailscale; WSUS auto-approval for critical Windows cloud node patches; cloud findings verified via follow-up Wazuh SCA scan post-remediation |
| SI-2(2) | Automated Flaw Remediation Status | Watchtower auto-updates; WSUS auto-approval rules; n8n orchestration; Wazuh alerts on unpatched systems | Implemented | |
| SI-2(4) | Automated Patch Management Tools | PatchMon (Linux); WSUS (Windows); Watchtower (containers); OpenVAS/Nessus verification | Implemented | Cloud: PatchMon on 4 Linux cloud nodes; WSUS on 2 Windows cloud nodes; Wazuh vulnerability assessment on all 6 cloud nodes |
| SI-2(6) | Removal of Previous Versions | Old container images pruned after Watchtower updates; superseded patches cleaned via WSUS | Implemented | |
| SI-3 | Malicious Code Protection | Wazuh FIM with VirusTotal; Suricata/Snort signatures; ClamAV/Microsoft Defender; rootkit detection | Implemented | Cloud: Wazuh FIM and rootkit detection on all 6 cloud nodes; Microsoft Defender active on Windows Server 2025 (AWS and Azure); ClamAV freshclam on all 4 Linux cloud nodes; AWS GuardDuty ML-based behavioral detection, GCP SCC threat detection, Azure Defender for Cloud behavioral analytics provide cloud-native malware detection layer |
| SI-3(4) | Updates Only by Privileged Users | AV signature updates restricted to admin accounts; WSUS authorization | Implemented | |
| SI-3(10) | Malicious Code Analysis | Cortex multi-engine analysis (VirusTotal, Yara); Shuffle malware workflow; TheHive case management | Implemented | |
| SI-4 | System Monitoring | Prometheus; Uptime Kuma; Splunk/Elastic SIEM; Wazuh EDR; Suricata/Snort IDS; NetAlert; multi-layered detection | Implemented | Cloud: AWS CloudWatch Agent (CPU, memory, disk, network per EC2 instance) and GuardDuty behavioral detection; GCP Cloud Monitoring Ops Agent and SCC threat detection and VPC network IDS endpoint; Azure Monitor VM metric alert rules (7 active: Available Memory Bytes, Data Disk IOPS, Network In/Out, OS Disk IOPS, Percentage CPU, VM Availability) and Sentinel KQL detection rules; all 6 cloud nodes enrolled in Checkmk on-premises dashboard; Uptime Kuma monitors Tailscale tunnel health |
| SI-4(1) | System-Wide Intrusion Detection | Suricata/Snort on all network segments; centralized SIEM correlation | Implemented | |
| SI-4(2) | Automated Tools for Real-Time Analysis | Splunk real-time correlation; Wazuh real-time FIM; Elastic SIEM; Suricata inline blocking; Cortex automation | Implemented | |
| SI-4(4) | Inbound and Outbound Communications Traffic | Suricata/Snort IDS on all segments; pfSense flow logs; Traefik access logs; DNS query logging; complete visibility | Implemented | Cloud: AWS VPC flow logs (fl-03179f74e54bf1aa4, CloudWatch Logs); GCP VPC flow logs (default network, Flow Analyzer); Azure NSG flow logs (Network Watcher homelab-nsg2); Tailscale tunnel telemetry for all cloud-to-on-premises management paths |
| SI-4(5) | System-Generated Alerts | Discord webhooks; Splunk scheduled alerts; Wazuh Discord/email; Prometheus Alertmanager; CVSS-based routing | Implemented | |
| SI-4(12) | Automated Alerts | Prometheus Alertmanager; Grafana automated alerts; Splunk real-time searches; Wazuh Active Response triggers | Implemented | |
| SI-4(16) | Correlate Monitoring Information | Multi-source correlation across Splunk/Elastic/Wazuh/network logs; TheHive aggregation | Implemented | Cloud: cloud node Wazuh agent telemetry included in on-premises Splunk SPL correlation searches; GuardDuty and Sentinel findings auto-create TheHive cases via Shuffle SOAR for unified case management |
| SI-4(18) | Analyze Traffic/Event Patterns | Cortex pattern recognition; MISP campaign correlation | Partial | |
| SI-4(23) | Host-Based Devices | Wazuh EDR on 25+ on-premises endpoints; FIM real-time monitoring; rootkit detection; process monitoring; Sysmon integration | Implemented | Cloud: Wazuh EDR deployed on all 6 cloud nodes with same FIM, rootkit detection, process monitoring, and CIS SCA configuration as on-premises (31+ total agents) |
| SI-5 | Security Alerts, Advisories, and Directives | PatchMon CVE alerts; WUD update notifications; Discord webhooks; OpenVAS/Nessus scan completion alerts | Implemented | |
| SI-5(1) | Automated Alerts and Advisories | Discord webhooks for scan completion; CVSS-based alert routing; TheHive case auto-creation | Implemented | |
| SI-7 | Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity | Docker image SHA-256 verification; Step-CA certificate validation; Wazuh FIM integrity monitoring | Implemented | |
| SI-7(1) | Integrity Checks | Wazuh FIM real-time integrity monitoring; file hash verification; registry monitoring (Windows) | Implemented | Cloud: Wazuh FIM on all 6 cloud nodes monitors same critical paths as on-premises (Linux: /etc, /bin, /sbin; Windows: System32, registry keys) |
| SI-7(6) | Cryptographic Protection | SHA-256 image signatures; TLS certificate validation; file integrity checksums | Implemented | |
| SI-7(7) | Integration of Detection and Response | Wazuh FIM triggers Active Response; SIEM correlation with integrity violations | Implemented | Cloud: Wazuh Active Response on cloud nodes triggers firewall-drop, host-deny, account-disable in response to integrity violations |
| SI-10 | Information Input Validation | WAF input validation (SafeLine); Traefik header validation; DNS query sanitization | Implemented | |
| SI-12 | Information Management and Retention | 90-day log retention; 30-day backup retention; automated lifecycle management | Implemented | Cloud: cloud audit log retention policy (AWS S3 90-day lifecycle; GCP 400-day Admin Activity; Azure Log Analytics 90-day) consistent with on-premises SIEM policy |
Supply Chain Risk Management (SR) — 40% Compliant¶
| Control | Control Name | Implementation | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SR-3 | Supply Chain Controls and Processes | Vetted open-source projects; trusted Docker registries; official package repositories | Partial | Cloud: AWS IAM instance profiles (least-privilege, no long-lived access keys on EC2); GCP service accounts (minimal roles, no owner/editor on Compute instances); Azure VMs provisioned via ARM template with securestring parameters; all 6 cloud nodes enrolled in same vetted open-source management stack (Wazuh, Ansible, Checkmk, PatchMon) as on-premises hosts |
| SR-10 | Inspection of Systems or Components | Visual inspection of hardware; no formal process | Partial | |
| SR-11 | Component Authenticity | Docker image signature verification; package signature validation | Implemented | Cloud: cloud provider base images (AMIs, GCP Compute images, Azure Marketplace images) tracked by version; provider-maintained images used with same-day security patch availability |
| SR-12 | Component Disposal | Secure deletion procedures; encrypted storage wiping | Implemented | Cloud: AWS EC2 EBS volume deletion on instance termination; GCP persistent disk deletion; Azure Managed Disk cleanup — all documented in decommissioning runbook |
Version History
| Version | Date | Changes |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0 | January 2026 | Initial release |
| 2.0 | April 2026 | Cloud IaaS integration (AWS, Azure, GCP — 6 nodes). Cloud content integrated into Notes column of all relevant controls. Change log added |